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		<title>Sanctions</title>
		<link>https://gamlet.pro</link>
		<language>ru</language>
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			<title>EU Commission Unveils Details of 19th Sanctions Package Against Russia</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/jvoub3nte1-eu-commission-unveils-details-of-19th-sa</link>
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			<pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2025 13:46:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has outlined the EU’s proposed 19th round of sanctions targeting Russia</description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU Commission Unveils Details of 19th Sanctions Package Against Russia</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6130-6164-4639-b664-626137313934/news1.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">EU Commission Unveils Details of 19th Sanctions Package Against Russia<br />19 September 2025</div><div class="t-redactor__text">European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has outlined the EU’s proposed 19th round of sanctions targeting Russia. If approved, the package would introduce several new measures, including:<br />• A complete ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports into the EU starting January 2027;<br />• Sanctions on 118 additional vessels linked to Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”;<br />• A full ban on transactions involving Russian energy giants Rosneft and Gazpromneft;<br />• Asset freezes targeting refineries, oil traders, and petrochemical firms based in third countries, including China;<br />• Expanded transaction bans covering more Russian and foreign banks;<br />• Sanctions on cryptocurrency networks and Russian financial institutions tied to alternative payment systems, including a ban on crypto transactions;<br />• Restrictions on dealing with entities operating in special economic zones associated with the war in Ukraine;<br />• Stricter export controls on military-related technologies, including drones; and<br />• Export restrictions on 45 newly designated companies.</div><div class="t-redactor__text">The proposed package still requires unanimous approval from all EU member states.<br /><br />The EU’s previous, 18th sanctions package was adopted in July 2025. A key measure from that round — an oil price cap — came into effect on 3 September 2025. Von der Leyen also confirmed that G7 countries intend to align with the latest EU sanctions.</div>]]>
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			<title>UK Sanctions: New Starter Guide and Reporting Tool</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/bo0uh3maf1-uk-sanctions-new-starter-guide-and-repor</link>
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			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2025 13:50:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) has released a new starter guide to help businesses understand and comply with UK sanctions. Alongside this, OFSI has launched an online service for reporting suspected sanctions breaches.</description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK Sanctions: New Starter Guide and Reporting Tool</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3966-6134-4166-a637-343031666433/news2.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">news2</div><div class="t-redactor__text">UK Sanctions: New Starter Guide and Reporting Tool<br /><br />The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) has released a new starter guide to help businesses understand and comply with UK sanctions. Alongside this, OFSI has launched an online service for reporting suspected sanctions breaches.<br /><br />What’s in the Starter Guide?<br /><br />Designed for businesses, the guide provides clear information on:<br />• Who is subject to UK sanctions<br />• Types of sanctions and the UK’s sanctions regimes<br />• How to search the UK sanctions lists<br />• Requirements for due diligence, including assessing ownership and control<br />• Licensing, exceptions, and compliance obligations<br />• Penalties for non-compliance or sanctions evasion<br /><br />New Sanctions Breach Reporting Service<br /><br />OFSI’s new digital reporting tool makes it easier to submit suspected sanctions breaches directly to the relevant government authorities.</div>]]>
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			<title>OFAC Reaches $750,000 Settlement with ShapeShift AG Over Sanctions Violations</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/kd4r0ivc51-ofac-reaches-750000-settlement-with-shap</link>
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			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2025 16:31:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has announced a $750,000 settlement with ShapeShift AG for apparent violations of U.S. sanctions related to Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. </description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>OFAC Reaches $750,000 Settlement with ShapeShift AG Over Sanctions Violations</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3765-3831-4865-a466-313035326265/news3.jpg"/></figure>The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has announced a $750,000 settlement with ShapeShift AG for apparent violations of U.S. sanctions related to Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. ]]>
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			<title>Case Study: UK Sanctions Body Fines Pharma Firm £152,750 for Breaching Russia Sanctions</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/jo1khm7iz1-case-study-uk-sanctions-body-fines-pharm</link>
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			<pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2025 10:59:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) has fined Colorcon Limited, a UK-based pharmaceutical company, £152,750 for violating sanctions imposed on Russia.</description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>Case Study: UK Sanctions Body Fines Pharma Firm £152,750 for Breaching Russia Sanctions</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3166-3138-4666-a135-383733363766/news4.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">What Happened?<br /><br />Colorcon operated a branch in Moscow that made 123 payments to accounts held at four sanctioned Russian banks between March and December 2022. These payments were processed by a Russian bookkeeper and approved by Colorcon employees in the UK—none of whom conducted adequate checks for sanctions compliance.<br /><br />Out of the 123 payments:<br />• 44 were legally permitted under a General License (GL) for “winding down” business.<br />• 79 payments, totaling £128,278, were found to be in breach of Regulation 12 of the UK Russia Sanctions Regulations, which bans providing funds to sanctioned individuals or entities.<br /><br />OFSI’s Assessment<br /><br />OFSI considered both aggravating and mitigating factors in setting the penalty:<br /><br />Aggravating Factors:<br />• The value of the breach payments was significant.<br />• The funds were sent to sanctioned banks, undermining UK sanctions.<br />• Colorcon had a long-standing presence in Russia and should have been aware of the risks.<br />• The company lacked effective compliance controls and failed to recognise the scope of the General License.<br />• Colorcon made repeated errors and delayed informing OFSI about the breaches for four months.<br /><br />Mitigating Factors:<br />• Payments were for medical and humanitarian purposes.<br />• Colorcon voluntarily disclosed the breaches, with largely timely and detailed reports.<br />• The company decided to exit the Russian market in August 2022, showing some awareness of the sanctions landscape.<br /><br />Penalty Breakdown<br /><br />The initial penalty was set at £235,000, but this was reduced by 35% due to Colorcon’s voluntary disclosure. A full 50% discount could have applied if the breach had been reported earlier.<br /><br />Final fine: £152,750.<br /><br />Key Takeaways for Businesses<br /><br />OFSI highlighted five critical compliance lessons:<br />1. Don’t rely solely on third parties for sanctions checks—companies remain liable for breaches.<br />2. Review and update sanctions policies regularly; outdated procedures may not be seen as mitigating.<br />3. A General License doesn’t cover everything—only activities that meet specific terms.<br />4. Failing to meet General License reporting obligations is an offence and will count against a company.<br />5. Report breaches promptly to benefit from full voluntary disclosure discounts.</div>]]>
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			<title>UN Sanctions on Iran Officially Reinstated as Snapback Process Concludes</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/cy5fanyr41-un-sanctions-on-iran-officially-reinstat</link>
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			<pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2025 11:01:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>As of today, UN sanctions against Iran have been fully reinstated for the first time since 2015, following the end of the snapback mechanism initiated by the UK, France, and Germany (the E3) on 28 August 2025.</description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>UN Sanctions on Iran Officially Reinstated as Snapback Process Concludes</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6334-3132-4262-b333-303564316237/news5.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">The snapback took effect automatically after the UN Security Council failed to pass a resolution extending the process within the required timeframe. All UN member states are now obligated to implement these sanctions through national legislation.<br /><br />UN Sanctions Reimposed<br /><br />The reimposed measures are grounded in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which had temporarily lifted previous sanctions as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under paragraph 11, any JCPOA participant can trigger snapback in the event of a “significant non-performance” by Iran. With no counter-resolution passed within 30 days, earlier sanctions have now resumed under the following reinstated resolutions:<br />• Resolution 1737 (2006): Asset freezes on individuals/entities linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs; restrictions on nuclear-related materials and technology.<br />• Resolution 1747 (2007): Ban on Iranian arms exports; additional asset freezes, including on Iranian banks tied to the IRGC.<br />• Resolution 1803 (2008): Travel bans, more asset freezes, and authorization to inspect Iranian cargo.<br />• Resolution 1929 (2010): Prohibited sales of heavy conventional weapons; expanded asset freezes, including those related to the IRGC.<br />• Resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1835 (2008): Reiterated calls for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, though they did not impose sanctions.<br /><br />⸻<br /><br />EU Implements Reinstated Sanctions<br /><br />The European Union has formally reimposed all applicable UN sanctions across member states. Key measures include:<br />• Travel bans and asset freezes on listed individuals and entities.<br />• Ban on financial transactions involving sanctioned parties, including the Central Bank of Iran and several commercial banks.<br />• Import bans on Iranian crude oil, natural gas, petrochemical products, and related services.<br />• Export restrictions on energy sector equipment, gold, precious metals, diamonds, certain naval equipment, and software.<br />• Ban on Iranian cargo flights landing in EU airports.<br /><br />The EU has reimposed sanctions on 54 individuals and 161 entities under its Iran nuclear sanctions regime (Regulation (EU) 267/2012), with the following updates:<br />• Regulation (EU) 2025/1975: Restricts sale/export of sensitive goods, including nuclear technology and cybersecurity software.<br />• Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1980: Sanctions 8 people and 85 entities, including Bank Mellat and others tied to Iran’s missile program or its government.<br />• Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1982: Targets 43 individuals and 60 entities, including 15 linked to the IRGC and 3 connected to Iran’s shipping sector.<br /><br />The EU also continues to maintain a separate sanctions regime focused on human rights violations in Iran, which remains unaffected by the JCPOA or UN measures.<br /><br />In preparation for snapback, France enacted a national order on 26 September 2025 to transpose these sanctions into domestic law.<br /><br />⸻<br /><br />UK Reimposes UN Sanctions<br /><br />The UK has fully implemented the UN sanctions as required under international law, adding 71 new designations to its sanctions list under the Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019:<br />• 9 individuals are now subject to asset freezes.<br />• 62 entities, including Iranian government bodies, oil companies, and major banks such as Bank Mellat, are also under asset freeze restrictions.<br /><br />The UK continues to enforce two separate Iran sanctions regimes:<br />• Nuclear-related sanctions under the 2019 Nuclear Regulations<br />• Human rights sanctions under the 2019 Human Rights Regulations<br /><br />Both remain in place regardless of changes to UN sanctions. Further information is available on the UK Government’s Iran sanctions pages.<br /><br />⸻<br /><br />US Position</div><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and has since reimposed all US nuclear-related sanctions that had been lifted or waived under the deal. The US maintains that all UN member states must now comply with the reinstated sanctions. More details are available on US-Iran relations through the US sanctions resources.<br /><br />⸻<br /><br />International Reactions<br />• The E3 (UK, France, Germany) welcomed the reimposition of sanctions.<br />• The EU and US called for renewed diplomatic efforts and urged Iran to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).<br />• South Korea, current UN Security Council President, expressed support for international negotiations with Iran.<br /><br />Iran and Russia Oppose Sanctions<br />• Iran rejected the legitimacy of the snapback process, arguing that the E3 lacked legal standing to trigger it.<br />• Russia, through Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, also opposed the move, calling it “illegal and baseless.”</div>]]>
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			<title>EU Commission Proposes 50% Tariff on Most Steel Imports</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/5m2sxkh4p1-eu-commission-proposes-50-tariff-on-most</link>
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			<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 15:53:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>The European Commission has released a draft regulation proposing a 50% tariff on the majority of steel imports into the European Union. </description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU Commission Proposes 50% Tariff on Most Steel Imports</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3966-3732-4433-a333-326664346462/news6.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">The European Commission has released a draft regulation proposing a 50% tariff on the majority of steel imports into the European Union. This move follows the United States’ recent introduction of a similar 50% global steel import tariff in June 2025.<br /><br />If adopted, the EU proposal would:<br />• Cap duty-free steel imports at 18.3 million tonnes annually.<br />• Double the current out-of-quota tariff rate from 25% to 50%.<br /><br />The draft regulation will now be reviewed by the EU Council and European Parliament. Both institutions may suggest amendments. If they agree on a final version and formally adopt it, the regulation will become law across the EU.<br /><br />Background: Current Import Framework<br /><br />Steel imports into the EU are currently governed by the safeguard measure under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159, which is set to expire in June 2026. That framework imposes a 25% tariff on imports exceeding established quotas.<br /><br />In March 2025, the Commission introduced the Steel and Metals Action Plan and initiated consultations on revising the safeguard system. The Commission argues that the proposed tariff hike is necessary because the EU is the only major steel-producing region experiencing a decline in production capacity. It also cited a lack of progress on global efforts to address chronic steel overcapacity. The higher tariff is intended to reduce the risk of excess steel being redirected to the EU due to stricter import measures in other markets.<br /><br />Determining the Tariff-Free Import Volume<br /><br />The proposed 18.3 million tonne tariff-free quota is based on the share of imports in the EU steel market prior to the current overcapacity crisis. The base year for this calculation is 2013, when imports accounted for 13% of EU steel consumption. This percentage was applied to 2024’s total steel consumption to determine the new quota. Steel imports from Russia and Belarus are excluded, as they are already subject to bans.<br /><br />Application of New Tariff Quotas<br /><br />The new quotas would affect nearly all non-EU countries, even those with EU free trade agreements. However, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein would be exempt. Quotas will be set by product category.<br /><br />Additionally, the proposal includes measures to identify steel from “melt and pour” countries—nations that produce raw steel but export it to other countries for further processing. According to the Commission, tracking these imports would improve transparency in the steel supply chain.</div>]]>
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			<title>US Supreme Court Allows Halkbank Sanctions Evasion Case to Move Forward</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/ty9gvzltd1-us-supreme-court-allows-halkbank-sanctio</link>
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			<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 15:53:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to hear an appeal by Turkiye Halk Bankasi (Halkbank), effectively allowing the sanctions evasion case against the Turkish state-owned bank to proceed.</description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Supreme Court Allows Halkbank Sanctions Evasion Case to Move Forward</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3766-3335-4137-b330-383937653762/news7.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to hear an appeal by Turkiye Halk Bankasi (Halkbank), effectively allowing the sanctions evasion case against the Turkish state-owned bank to proceed.<br /><br />Halkbank is accused of helping Iran bypass U.S. sanctions by using gold trades and fraudulent humanitarian aid transactions. Prosecutors allege the scheme enabled Iran’s government, central bank, and national oil company to access billions of dollars in restricted funds.<br /><br />The bank argued that it was protected from prosecution under U.S. common law sovereign immunity, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that claim. With the Supreme Court refusing to take up the case, the matter now returns to a U.S. District Court for further proceedings.<br /><br />This marks another legal setback for Halkbank. In 2023, the Supreme Court had already ruled that the bank does not have immunity under U.S. statutory law.</div>]]>
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			<title>Non-EU Countries Align with EU Sanctions on Russia, Syria, and Human Rights</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/0o7u5y2cu1-non-eu-countries-align-with-eu-sanctions</link>
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			<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 15:53:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>The Council of the European Union has announced that several non-EU countries have aligned their national policies with recent EU sanctions decisions related to Russia, Syria, and human rights.</description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>Non-EU Countries Align with EU Sanctions on Russia, Syria, and Human Rights</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3430-6239-4237-a461-616264333064/news8.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">The Council of the European Union has announced that several non-EU countries have aligned their national policies with recent EU sanctions decisions related to Russia, Syria, and human rights.<br /><br />Russia Sanctions<br /><br />On 12 September 2025, the EU extended its targeted sanctions against Russia under Regulation (EU) 269/2014 until 15 March 2026. The following countries have aligned with this extension and committed to implementing the same measures:<br />Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, and Ukraine.<br /><br />Syria Sanctions<br /><br />On 22 September 2025, the EU removed Hala Almaghout from its Syria sanctions list, following a successful legal challenge at the EU General Court. The following countries have agreed to mirror this action:<br />Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, and Ukraine.<br /><br />Human Rights Sanctions<br /><br />On 5 September 2025, the EU imposed sanctions on two individuals under its global human rights sanctions regime (Regulation (EU) 2020/1998). These countries have aligned with the EU’s decision and will apply equivalent measures:<br />Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, and Ukraine.</div>]]>
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			<title>EU Extends Sanctions Regime Targeting Russian Hybrid Threats Until 2026</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/kl5e3ghnp1-eu-extends-sanctions-regime-targeting-ru</link>
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			<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 15:53:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>The EU Council has extended its sanctions targeting Russian hybrid threats for an additional year, until 9 October 2026, under Decision (CFSP) 2025/2019. </description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU Extends Sanctions Regime Targeting Russian Hybrid Threats Until 2026</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3836-3261-4461-a539-383233363364/news9.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">The EU Council has extended its sanctions targeting Russian hybrid threats for an additional year, until 9 October 2026, under Decision (CFSP) 2025/2019. These sanctions, first introduced in 2024 under Regulation (EU) 2024/2642, aim to counter activities that undermine democracy and the rule of law within the EU.<br /><br />The sanctions regime targets individuals and entities deemed responsible for or involved in electoral interference, cyber-attacks, and the promotion of armed conflict in third countries, which are considered part of Russia’s hybrid threat strategies.<br /><br />Currently, 47 individuals and 15 entities are subject to the measures, which include asset freezes, bans on financial transactions, and travel restrictions within the EU.</div>]]>
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			<title>The German Government has officially condemned the U.S. embargo&#039;s reach into German jurisdiction, affirming that such actions breach international law and are countered by strictly enforced European a</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/c6h6bkliy1-the-german-government-has-officially-con</link>
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			<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 13:40:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>In response to formal inquiries from Die Linke Party members, the German Government has clarified its position regarding the U.S. blockade of Cuba and its extraterritorial impact. </description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>The German Government has officially condemned the U.S. embargo's reach into German jurisdiction, affirming that such actions breach international law and are countered by strictly enforced European a</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6238-3364-4165-b930-646639363733/unnamed.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">The executive branch asserted that the application of these U.S. measures within Germany is "contrary to German interests and the interests of the European Union," further noting that such practices constitute a violation of international law.</div><div class="t-redactor__text">To safeguard its sovereignty and economic interests, the Government cited the <strong>EU Blocking Regulation (Regulation (EC) 2271/96)</strong>. This legislation is a directly applicable European law, which is implemented domestically through Germany's <strong>Foreign Trade and Payments Act and Ordinance</strong>. Under this legal framework, any failure to adhere to the Blocking Regulation is categorized as an administrative offense.<br /><br />For businesses that may be impacted by the U.S. blockade, the Government provides access to official EU guidance. Additionally, German companies are encouraged to seek assistance from their regional Chambers of Industry and Commerce for matters concerning the application of the Blocking Regulation. Detailed information regarding the Foreign Trade and Payment Act and the broader execution of EU sanctions in Germany is also available for review.</div>]]>
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			<title>UK Cyber Sanctions: Current Enforcement Actions</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/ypa1mkc9k1-uk-cyber-sanctions-current-enforcement-a</link>
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			<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 13:52:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
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			<description>The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) is currently investigating up to five potential violations of cyber-related asset freezes within the financial services industry, following a successful Freedom of Information appeal.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK Cyber Sanctions: Current Enforcement Actions</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3933-6137-4234-a266-323434666137/unnamed_1.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">Data obtained via a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to HM Treasury indicates that the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) has initiated between one and five active investigations. These inquiries focus on potential non-compliance with asset freezes established under the United Kingdom’s cyber sanctions framework.<br /><br /><strong>Sector Focus and Confidentiality</strong><br /><br />All identified potential violations are concentrated within the financial services sector. However, the Treasury has withheld specific details regarding these cases to ensure that current and prospective investigative processes remain uncompromised.<br /><br /><strong>Disclosure Background</strong><br /><br />The public release of this data followed a multi-stage transparency process. While an initial Freedom of Information request was denied, a subsequent internal review overturned that decision, resulting in the disclosure of the ongoing investigative activity.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>Latvian Enforcement of IT Service Restrictions</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/czekaruu01-latvian-enforcement-of-it-service-restri</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/czekaruu01-latvian-enforcement-of-it-service-restri?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 00:46:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6565-6537-4561-a437-373062633264/unnamed_2.jpg" type="image/jpeg"/>
			<description>Latvian authorities are prosecuting a person for delivering software services to a Russian firm and receiving compensation via a sanctioned bank, marking the country's fifth such enforcement action recently.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Latvian Enforcement of IT Service Restrictions</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6565-6537-4561-a437-373062633264/unnamed_2.jpg"/></figure><div class="t-redactor__text">The State Security Service of Latvia has initiated legal proceedings against a person accused of supplying programming services to a company based in Russia. This case represents the fifth instance in a recent series of Latvian prosecutions involving the illegal provision of services under Regulation 833/2014 or the delivery of "economic resources" to sanctioned entities in violation of asset freezes.</div><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">Financial Violations and Designated Entities</h3><div class="t-redactor__text">The charges against the individual extend to the method of their compensation. The prosecution asserts that the individual’s salary was deposited into Alfa-Bank, an institution currently designated under European Union sanctions. According to the authorities, using this account constitutes the illegal act of making financial funds available to a sanctioned entity.</div><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">Context of Recent Legal Actions</h3><div class="t-redactor__text">This latest prosecution follows a trend of strict implementation of EU sanctions laws within Latvia, following four similar cases recorded between October and December 2025. These actions collectively target both the direct provision of prohibited technical services and the indirect financial interactions that support blacklisted organizations.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>An individual in Latvia faces criminal charges for violating EU sanctionsns</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/s6nm6izh11-an-individual-in-latvia-faces-criminal-c</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/s6nm6izh11-an-individual-in-latvia-faces-criminal-c?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 22:46:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3966-6665-4537-b663-303066613163/unnamed_3.jpg" type="image/jpeg"/>
			<description>by performing remote software programming for a Russian firm and receiving payments through a blacklisted financial institution</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>An individual in Latvia faces criminal charges for violating EU sanctionsns</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3966-6665-4537-b663-303066613163/unnamed_3.jpg"/></figure><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">Prosecution for Prohibited Technical Services</h3><div class="t-redactor__text">The State Security Service of Latvia has officially charged an individual with circumventing European Union sanctions targeting Russia. According to the allegations, the person provided remote programming assistance to a Russian-based entity, a collaboration that reportedly began in 2022. Under <strong>Article 5n of Regulation (EU) 833/2014</strong>, the provision of such IT and programming services to Russia is strictly forbidden.</div><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">Financial Violations and Asset Freezes</h3><div class="t-redactor__text">The charges also address the financial aspect of the arrangement. The individual’s compensation was deposited into an account at <strong>Alfa-Bank</strong>, a financial institution currently sanctioned by the EU. Authorities state that this transaction violates <strong>Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 269/2014</strong>, which prohibits making funds or economic resources available to designated persons or entities.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>Canada has expanded its Iranian sanctions</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/618fx2svp1-canada-has-expanded-its-iranian-sanction</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/618fx2svp1-canada-has-expanded-its-iranian-sanction?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 17 Feb 2026 12:09:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3731-6666-4638-a431-653164643765/unnamed_4.jpg" type="image/jpeg"/>
			<description>to include seven individuals associated with the "Zindashti" criminal network and the Iranian government, citing their involvement in activities that threaten international security.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Canada has expanded its Iranian sanctions</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3731-6666-4638-a431-653164643765/unnamed_4.jpg"/></figure><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">Expansion of Canadian Sanctions on Iran</h3><div class="t-redactor__text">Under the <strong>Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations</strong>, the Canadian government has designated seven additional individuals. According to official press releases and background information, these persons are sanctioned for their roles in Iran-led operations that compromise global stability, peace, and security.</div><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">Targeted Individuals and the "Zindashti" Network</h3><div class="t-redactor__text">The newly sanctioned list features key figures from the <strong>Zindashti network</strong>, a transnational organized crime syndicate that operates alongside Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Notable inclusions are:</div><div class="t-redactor__text"><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Naji Ibrahim Sharifi Zindashti</strong>: Identified as the leader of the criminal organization.</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Intelligence and Military Officials</strong>: Members of both the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Diplomatic Personnel</strong>: A former employee of the Iranian consulate located in Türkiye.</li></ul></div><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">International Context and Sanctions Totals</h3><div class="t-redactor__text">The designation of Mr. Zindashti follows similar actions taken by the <strong>United States and United Kingdom in 2024</strong>, and the <strong>European Union in 2025</strong>. These international bodies have previously asserted that the Zindashti network facilitates kidnappings and assassinations at the behest of the Iranian state.</div><div class="t-redactor__text">With these additions, Canada’s total sanctions under the Iran regulations now encompass 222 individuals and 256 entities. Further details on these regimes and the Special Economic Measures Act are available via dedicated Canadian regulatory resource pages.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>The UK delisted former Sovcombank Deputy Chairman Alexy Panferov</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/ufanf0dr01-the-uk-delisted-former-sovcombank-deputy</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/ufanf0dr01-the-uk-delisted-former-sovcombank-deputy?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Thu, 19 Feb 2026 23:38:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3430-6234-4637-b963-383366396530/unnamed_5.jpg" type="image/jpeg"/>
			<description>and updated the sanctions criteria for Turkish firm By Inovasyon, shifting its focus from the Russian defense sector to destabilizing activities in Ukraine.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>The UK delisted former Sovcombank Deputy Chairman Alexy Panferov</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3430-6234-4637-b963-383366396530/unnamed_5.jpg"/></figure><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">Sanctions Update: UK Delistings and Amendments</h3><div class="t-redactor__text">The UK removed <strong>Alexy Panferov</strong>, former Deputy Chairman of <strong>Sovcombank</strong>, from its Russia sanctions list. Panferov, designated in 2022 and represented by Peters &amp; Peters, follows the 2025 delistings of former colleagues Ilya Brodskiy and Aleksey Fisun. Sovcombank itself remains sanctioned.</div><div class="t-redactor__text">Additionally, the UK modified the listing for Turkish company <strong>By Inovasyon Teknoloji</strong>. Previously designated in 2024 for involvement in the Russian defense sector, its basis now focuses on providing financial services or funds that contribute to <strong>destabilizing Ukraine</strong>.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>Switzerland has delisted a Hamas</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/mkju6irz91-switzerland-has-delisted-a-hamas</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/mkju6irz91-switzerland-has-delisted-a-hamas?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2026 02:09:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3232-3436-4738-a331-623762313066/unnamed_6.jpg" type="image/jpeg"/>
			<description>official following reports of his death and added seven individuals to its Sudan sanctions list to align with recent EU measures.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Switzerland has delisted a Hamas</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3232-3436-4738-a331-623762313066/unnamed_6.jpg"/></figure><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">Sanctions Update: UK Delistings and Amendments</h3><h3  class="t-redactor__h3">Swiss Sanctions Update</h3><div class="t-redactor__text">Switzerland removed <strong>Ismail Barhoum</strong> from its Hamas/PIJ sanctions list. Barhoum, a member of the Hamas Political Bureau and Shura Council, is reportedly deceased, though he remains listed by the EU, UK, US, and Australia.</div><div class="t-redactor__text">Additionally, Switzerland designated <strong>seven individuals</strong> connected to the RSF and SAF under its Sudan sanctions regime. This move aligns with the EU’s January 2026 designations in response to escalating violence in Sudan.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Court Rules Section 122 Tariffs Unlawful: A Blow to Presidential Trade Powers</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/meplkf81u1-us-court-rules-section-122-tariffs-unlaw</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/meplkf81u1-us-court-rules-section-122-tariffs-unlaw?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 22:18:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3435-6634-4031-b636-343361623032/istockphoto-11992798.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>The US Court of International Trade ruled that Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 does not authorize tariffs beyond balance-of-payments deficits. Relief was granted only to the three parties who challenged the measure.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Court Rules Section 122 Tariffs Unlawful: A Blow to Presidential Trade Powers</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3435-6634-4031-b636-343361623032/istockphoto-11992798.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Court Rules Section 122 Tariffs Unlawful: A Blow to Presidential Trade Powers</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The US Court of International Trade struck down a Presidential Proclamation imposing a 10% tariff on all imports, ruling it exceeded the authority granted by Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. The Court clarified that this provision only covers tariffs addressing balance-of-payments deficits — not broader trade or investment imbalances. Relief was limited to the three parties who successfully challenged the measure.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Issues First Designations Under New Cuba Sanctions Executive Order 14404</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/29u3jo4bv1-us-issues-first-designations-under-new-c</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/29u3jo4bv1-us-issues-first-designations-under-new-c?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 23:03:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3264-3137-4737-b534-306138383461/premium_photo-169773.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>OFAC made its first designations under Executive Order 14404, targeting two Cuban entities and one individual for repression-related activities. A General License was also issued to manage the transition.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Issues First Designations Under New Cuba Sanctions Executive Order 14404</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3264-3137-4737-b534-306138383461/premium_photo-169773.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Issues First Designations Under New Cuba Sanctions Executive Order 14404</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has issued its first sanctions designations under Executive Order 14404, which entered into force on 1 May 2026. The new framework targets individuals and entities responsible for repression in Cuba.<br /><br />The following were designated under the order:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A (GAESA)</strong> — for operating in the financial services sector of the Cuban economy</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Ania Guillermina Lastres Morera (LASTRES)</strong> — as a senior leader and board member of GAESA</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Moa Nickel S.A (MNSA)</strong> — for operating in the metals and mining sector of Cuba</li></ul><br />OFAC simultaneously issued General License No. 1, which authorises transactions that were already permitted under the pre-existing Cuban Assets Control Regulations, ensuring continuity for previously licensed activities.<br /><br />OFAC has clarified that EO 14404 applies exclusively to foreign persons specifically listed under the order, and does not automatically block those already identified under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Sanctions Iraqi Oil Official and Iran-Linked Militias Under &quot;Economic Fury&quot; Campaign</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/ghlg7rcck1-us-sanctions-iraqi-oil-official-and-iran</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/ghlg7rcck1-us-sanctions-iraqi-oil-official-and-iran?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 10:16:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6363-3139-4431-b864-613463396465/istockphoto-22533777.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>The US designated four individuals and four entities tied to Iraq's oil sector and Iranian-backed militias, targeting Iran's petroleum trade and groups supporting terrorism.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Sanctions Iraqi Oil Official and Iran-Linked Militias Under "Economic Fury" Campaign</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6363-3139-4431-b864-613463396465/istockphoto-22533777.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Sanctions Iraqi Oil Official and Iran-Linked Militias Under "Economic Fury" Campaign</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has expanded its Iran sanctions list by adding four individuals and four entities connected to Iraq's oil industry, as part of the ongoing "Economic Fury" campaign aimed at cutting off Iran's oil revenues.<br /><br />The designations were issued under Executive Order 13902, which targets Iran's petroleum sector, and Executive Order 13224, directed at terrorist organizations and their financiers.<br /><br /><strong>Individuals designated:</strong><br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Ali Maarji Al-Bahadly</strong> — Iraq's Deputy Minister of Oil, accused of diverting Iraqi oil products to sanctioned individuals and the terrorist militia Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH)</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili</strong> — leader and economic official of AAH</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Ahmed Khudair Maksus Maksus</strong> — former Deputy Secretary General of militia Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS)</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Mohammed Issa Kadhim al-Shuwaili</strong> — senior KSS official</li></ul><strong>Entities designated</strong> (all linked to Al-Behadili):<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Gulf Energy for General Transport and Marine Services and Real Estate Consultancy LLC</li><li data-list="bullet">Gulf Energy Oil Services Limited</li><li data-list="bullet">Gulf General Contracting Limited</li><li data-list="bullet">Iraq International Energy for the Import and Sale for Petroleum Products Limited</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>Russian Court Orders EU Companies to Pay €8.8M, Rejecting EU Sanctions as Legal Defence</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/2bk0m72g01-russian-court-orders-eu-companies-to-pay</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/2bk0m72g01-russian-court-orders-eu-companies-to-pay?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 21:02:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6561-3631-4935-a336-666631373037/photo-1690831327125-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>A Russian arbitration court ruled that EU sanctions do not justify withholding advance payments, ordering two EU companies to compensate a Russian port operator €8.8M for an unfulfilled contract.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Russian Court Orders EU Companies to Pay €8.8M, Rejecting EU Sanctions as Legal Defence</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6561-3631-4935-a336-666631373037/photo-1690831327125-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Russian Court Orders EU Companies to Pay €8.8M, Rejecting EU Sanctions as Legal Defence</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The Arbitration Court of the Murmansk Region has ordered two EU-based companies to pay €8,799,286 in damages to Port Lavna, a Russian port operator, ruling that EU sanctions did not constitute a valid legal justification for retaining advance payments.<br /><br />The dispute dates back to 2018, when Port Lavna contracted the EU companies to design and install equipment for a coal handling facility at Murmansk port. The company paid €8.8m in advance payments in 2019. Following the EU's amendment of Regulation 833/2014 in April 2022 — which prohibited the supply of certain equipment to Russian entities — the EU companies halted work and refused to return the advance.<br /><br />Port Lavna initially pursued ICC arbitration seeking a refund, but the claim was unsuccessful. A Russian prosecutor subsequently moved to block recognition of the ICC award in Russia, arguing it conflicted with Russian public policy. The Murmansk court agreed, noting that Russian law does not treat EU sanctions as creating binding obligations on Russian entities, and that the arbitration panel — composed of nationals from states Russia classifies as "unfriendly" — could not guarantee a fair hearing.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">With the ICC award blocked, Lavna filed a tort claim in Russian courts for the same amount. The court assumed jurisdiction under Articles 247 and 248.1 of the Russian Arbitration Procedure Code, excluded Dutch law as contrary to Russian public policy, and held both EU companies jointly liable for the full sum.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>Ukraine Expands Russia Sanctions List: 66 New Designations and 34 Relistings</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/71xafz1zt1-ukraine-expands-russia-sanctions-list-66</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/71xafz1zt1-ukraine-expands-russia-sanctions-list-66?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 16:20:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3361-6534-4030-b337-373238646234/photo-1647887070925-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>Ukraine designated 66 individuals and entities in Russia's defence sector and relisted 34 others whose 2023 listings were expiring, targeting missile supply chains and sanctions circumvention networks.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Ukraine Expands Russia Sanctions List: 66 New Designations and 34 Relistings</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3361-6534-4030-b337-373238646234/photo-1647887070925-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Ukraine Expands Russia Sanctions List: 66 New Designations and 34 Relistings</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">Ukraine has significantly expanded its sanctions list, adding 66 individuals and entities active in Russia's defence manufacturing sector under Ukraine's Sanctions Law, while simultaneously relisting 34 previously sanctioned persons whose designations were due to expire.<br /><br />The update was implemented through two presidential decrees:<br /><br /><strong>Decree 378/2026</strong> relists 13 individuals and 21 entities originally designated in 2023, including persons connected to VS Group Management LLC — a company established by members of the sanctioned "Luzhniki" group. Four entities from the original 2023 package were removed from the list after Ukraine determined they had ceased their unlawful activities.<br /><br /><strong>Decree 379/2026</strong> adds 34 people and 32 entities to the sanctions list. The new designations focus on actors involved in supply chains supporting Russia's air defence systems and ballistic missile programmes, as well as those procuring high-precision industrial machinery and electronic components in violation of existing sanctions.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Ukraine also noted that some of the listed individuals had attempted to lobby for the lifting of US sanctions on Russia and to undermine the EU's sanctions position, though their identities were not publicly disclosed.</li></ul></div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>UK High Court Orders Sanctioned VTB Bank to Pay £500,000 into Court as Security</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/krpgxx9101-uk-high-court-orders-sanctioned-vtb-bank</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/krpgxx9101-uk-high-court-orders-sanctioned-vtb-bank?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 20:24:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6333-3466-4532-b166-633733336661/istockphoto-13899171.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>The UK High Court ruled that VTB Bank must pay £500,000 into court as fortification for a worldwide freezing order, requiring the sanctioned bank to seek an OFSI/OFAC licence to do so.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK High Court Orders Sanctioned VTB Bank to Pay £500,000 into Court as Security</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6333-3466-4532-b166-633733336661/istockphoto-13899171.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK High Court Orders Sanctioned VTB Bank to Pay £500,000 into Court as Security</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The UK High Court has ruled that VTB Bank — subject to UK and US sanctions since February 2022 — must pay £500,000 into court as fortification for its cross-undertaking in damages, rather than simply ringfencing funds in its own accounts.<br /><br />The case arose after VTB obtained a worldwide freezing order in February 2026 against Timur Kuanyshev and his wife Alfiya Askar, in connection with a US$90 million claim in Russia. VTB had initially ringfenced £100,000 at Barclays as fortification. The respondents successfully applied to increase this amount to £500,000 and to have the funds paid directly into court.<br /><br />The court ordered VTB to apply for the necessary OFSI and/or OFAC licence as promptly as possible, noting that obtaining such a licence could take anywhere between six weeks and eighteen months. The court determined it was preferable to begin the licensing process immediately rather than wait until a formal payment order was issued.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The judgment did not address whether an additional licence would be required to release the funds from court in the event that a cross-undertaking claim were subsequently made against VTB.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>EU General Court Annuls Gutseriev&#039;s 2025 Belarus Sanctions Listing for Lack of Evidence</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/0npzk9ggy1-eu-general-court-annuls-gutserievs-2025</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/0npzk9ggy1-eu-general-court-annuls-gutserievs-2025?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 23:11:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3665-3164-4233-a565-363335386431/premium_photo-174249.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The EU General Court annulled Mikhail Gutseriev's February 2025 Belarus relisting, finding the Council failed to provide current evidence of his ties to the Lukashenko regime. It is the second such annulment.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU General Court Annuls Gutseriev's 2025 Belarus Sanctions Listing for Lack of Evidence</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3665-3164-4233-a565-363335386431/premium_photo-174249.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">EU General Court Annuls Gutseriev's 2025 Belarus Sanctions Listing for Lack of Evidence</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The EU's General Court has annulled the February 2025 Belarus sanctions relisting of Mikhail Gutseriev — a prominent Russian businessman — for the second time, following an earlier annulment of his 2024 relisting in Case T-233/24.<br /><br />Gutseriev was originally sanctioned by the EU in 2021 under Regulation 765/2006, on grounds that included allegations he had transported Russian workers to Belarus to replace striking state media employees. Several of those original grounds were dropped when he was relisted in 2025.<br /><br />Before the Court, Gutseriev argued that the Council's justification for maintaining his listing was outdated and factually unsupported. He noted that his Nezhinsky potash project had been nationalised by Belarus in 2023, that his energy sector connections related solely to the 2020 Russia-Belarus oil crisis, and that his commercial property interests in Minsk were insufficient to establish ongoing regime support. He also denied any current personal relationship with President Lukashenko.<br /><br />The Court agreed on all key points, finding that:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The Council had no updated evidence linking Gutseriev to the successor entity of the nationalised potash project</li><li data-list="bullet">The energy sector grounds were based entirely on events from 2020 — five years prior to the relisting</li><li data-list="bullet">Commercial property interests alone could not independently justify the designation</li><li data-list="bullet">Alleged 2023 meetings with Lukashenko were not proven, and a music competition win by Lukashenko's daughter-in-law at an event linked to Gutseriev did not demonstrate current regime ties</li><li data-list="bullet">The 2020 COVID-19 scanner donation was too dated to serve as supporting evidence once other grounds had fallen away</li></ul><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Gutseriev nonetheless remains subject to EU sanctions, having been relisted again in February 2026 on the same grounds as the now-annulled 2025 listing.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>EU&#039;s AMLA Flags Rising Sanctions Circumvention Risk Across Member States in 2025 Report</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/ju0laxr651-eus-amla-flags-rising-sanctions-circumve</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/ju0laxr651-eus-amla-flags-rising-sanctions-circumve?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2026 15:08:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3161-3264-4839-a564-613062333266/photo-1594810205183-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority published its 2025 Roadshow Report, identifying sanctions circumvention as a growing enforcement concern, with evasion techniques becoming increasingly sophisticated.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU's AMLA Flags Rising Sanctions Circumvention Risk Across Member States in 2025 Report</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3161-3264-4839-a564-613062333266/photo-1594810205183-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">EU's AMLA Flags Rising Sanctions Circumvention Risk Across Member States in 2025 Report</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The EU's Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) has released its 2025 Roadshow Report, drawing on consultations with supervisors, financial intelligence units (FIUs), and private sector representatives across all 27 EU member states.<br /><br />On the topic of sanctions, the report identifies several key trends and concerns:<br /><br /><strong>Sanctions circumvention on the rise.</strong> Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, evading sanctions has become a significantly more prominent supervisory and enforcement challenge across the EU.<br /><br /><strong>Geographic concentration of risk.</strong> The threat is felt most acutely in Baltic, Nordic, and Eastern European member states, which are geographically and economically closer to the conflict zone.<br /><br /><strong>Increasingly sophisticated evasion methods.</strong> Circumvention techniques are growing in complexity, and sanctions risks are now increasingly intertwined with cyber-enabled criminal activity.<br /><br /><strong>Compliance gap between sectors.</strong> Large financial institutions have invested substantially in sanctions compliance infrastructure. However, parts of the non-financial sector — including smaller businesses — have more limited resources and, in some cases, lower awareness of their legal obligations.<br /><br /><strong>AMLA's next steps.</strong> The authority intends to consolidate typologies and risk indicators at EU level and enhance cross-border coordination among national supervisors.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">AMLA was established in 2024 with a mandate to coordinate anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing efforts across the European Union.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>UK High Court Upholds Sanctions on Usmanov&#039;s Nephew, Confirms Legality of Family Association Criterion</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/j4xjsr0yk1-uk-high-court-upholds-sanctions-on-usman</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/j4xjsr0yk1-uk-high-court-upholds-sanctions-on-usman?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 11:52:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3262-6563-4861-a462-383865626534/photo-1697615787173-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The UK High Court rejected Sarvar Ismailov's delisting challenge, confirming that sanctioning individuals based on family ties to designated persons is lawful under the Russia Sanctions Regulations.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK High Court Upholds Sanctions on Usmanov's Nephew, Confirms Legality of Family Association Criterion</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3262-6563-4861-a462-383865626534/photo-1697615787173-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK High Court Upholds Sanctions on Usmanov's Nephew, Confirms Legality of Family Association Criterion</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The UK High Court has dismissed a legal challenge brought by Sarvar Ismailov — nephew of sanctioned oligarch Alisher Usmanov — against the UK Foreign Office's decision to maintain his designation under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulation 2019.<br /><br />Ismailov was designated in 2022 following an expansion of the UK's Russia sanctions framework, which broadened the definition of "associated with" to include "specified immediate family members." He was listed solely on the basis of his family relationship with Usmanov.<br /><br />Ismailov challenged the designation on the grounds that the family association criterion was unlawful and that he should be removed from the sanctions list. The High Court (Mr Justice Saini) rejected all grounds of the application, holding that:<br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>The family criterion is lawful.</strong> It operates foreseeably, with the Regulations setting out the specific circumstances in which family association can justify designation. The Court referred to the Court of Appeal's earlier judgment in <em>Khan</em> on this point.</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>The UK is not bound to mirror EU sanctions.</strong> It is entitled to apply its own, broader designation criteria independently.</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>The designation did not need to be made by the Secretary of State personally</strong> — a Foreign Office official was authorised to make the decision.</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>The designation was proportionate</strong>, consistent with the Supreme Court's approach in <em>Shvidler</em>.</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>The Foreign Office exercised its wide margin of appreciation</strong> in reviewing the available evidence, meaning the decision was neither irrational nor arbitrary.</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>The designation did not breach the UK Equality Act.</strong></li><li data-list="bullet"></li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>US Issues General Licence 134C Allowing Delivery of Russian Oil Already at Sea</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/8gobx6nik1-us-issues-general-licence-134c-allowing</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/8gobx6nik1-us-issues-general-licence-134c-allowing?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 23:45:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6261-3464-4964-b262-636131373663/photo-1616580621828-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US issued General Licence 134C, authorising the sale and delivery of Russian-origin oil loaded on vessels before 17 April 2026. The licence expires on 17 June 2026 and excludes Iran, North Korea and Cuba</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Issues General Licence 134C Allowing Delivery of Russian Oil Already at Sea</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6261-3464-4964-b262-636131373663/photo-1616580621828-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Issues General Licence 134C Allowing Delivery of Russian Oil Already at Sea</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has issued General Licence 134C, the fourth in a series of licences permitting the delivery and sale of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products already loaded onto vessels prior to 17 April 2026.<br /><br />The licence authorises all transactions ordinarily necessary for the sale, delivery, and offloading of such cargo — including on vessels blocked under US sanctions — provided the cargo was loaded on or before 12:01am EST on 17 April 2026. It replaces General Licence 134B, which expired on 16 May 2026, and remains valid until 17 June 2026.<br /><br />Transactions covered under the licence include:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Safe docking and anchoring of vessels carrying the relevant cargo</li><li data-list="bullet">Preservation of crew health and safety</li><li data-list="bullet">Emergency repairs and environmental protection measures</li><li data-list="bullet">Vessel management, crewing, bunkering, piloting, registration, flagging, insurance, classification, and salvage services</li></ul><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The licence explicitly excludes any transactions involving persons or entities in Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Crimea, or the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>Canada Reviews Bill C-219 to Expand Sanctions Scope and Protect Prisoners of Conscience</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/tengd24px1-canada-reviews-bill-c-219-to-expand-sanc</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/tengd24px1-canada-reviews-bill-c-219-to-expand-sanc?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Sun, 24 May 2026 00:48:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3565-3838-4530-b030-343530363666/photo-1691072459141-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>Canada's Parliamentary Committee reviewed Bill C-219, which proposes expanding visa bans to family members of sanctioned individuals and adding transnational repression as a new designation criterion.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Canada Reviews Bill C-219 to Expand Sanctions Scope and Protect Prisoners of Conscience</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3565-3838-4530-b030-343530363666/photo-1691072459141-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Canada Reviews Bill C-219 to Expand Sanctions Scope and Protect Prisoners of Conscience</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">Canada's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE) has held a parliamentary discussion on Bill C-219, introduced by MP James Bezan in 2025, as part of its ongoing legislative study.<br /><br />The bill proposes a series of amendments to Canada's Special Economic Measures Act, bringing it closer in line with EU and US sanctions practice:<br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Expanding visa bans</strong> to cover immediate family members of individuals already sanctioned under the Act or related regulations</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Adding transnational repression</strong> as a standalone designation criterion</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Requiring reporting</strong> by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the number of "prisoners of conscience" — individuals detained solely because of their identity or sincerely held beliefs, in violation of international human rights standards — held in foreign countries</li></ul><br />The discussion was held in conjunction with the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, which put forward additional recommendations:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Recognising arbitrary detention and torture of prisoners of conscience as independent grounds for designation</li><li data-list="bullet">Including data on prisoners of conscience in Global Affairs Canada's travel advisories</li><li data-list="bullet">Making publication of such data subject to the consent of the prisoner's family, rather than the discretion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs</li><li data-list="bullet">Embedding prisoner of conscience data directly into sanctions legislation</li><li data-list="bullet"></li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>UK Sanctions 18 Individuals and Entities Tied to Russian Crypto Evasion Network A7</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/6s7c5zbfd1-uk-sanctions-18-individuals-and-entities</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/6s7c5zbfd1-uk-sanctions-18-individuals-and-entities?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 20:54:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3562-6130-4538-b630-373265313238/premium_photo-171461.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The UK designated 4 people and 14 entities linked to the A7 crypto network used to evade Russia sanctions, and updated its personal remittance licence to cover cryptoasset payments.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK Sanctions 18 Individuals and Entities Tied to Russian Crypto Evasion Network A7</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3562-6130-4538-b630-373265313238/premium_photo-171461.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK Sanctions 18 Individuals and Entities Tied to Russian Crypto Evasion Network A7</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United Kingdom has added 18 individuals and entities to its sanctions list under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, targeting those connected to the A7 cryptocurrency network — a platform alleged to be used by Russia to circumvent existing international sanctions.<br /><br />The new designations include:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>3 people and 10 entities</strong> linked to A7, which was itself UK-designated in 2025. Among those listed are <strong>Sergey Mendeleev</strong>, a director of A7, and <strong>OJSC Eurasian Savings Bank</strong>, a Kyrgyzstan-registered financial institution</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>1 person and 2 entities</strong> active in Russia's financial sector</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>2 Kyrgyz entities</strong> conducting business of economic significance to the Russian government</li></ul><br />Alongside the designations, OFSI has updated General Licence INT/2024/4761108 — the personal remittance licence — to extend its scope to cryptoasset transactions. The licence permits non-UK designated persons to use retail banking services of sanctioned financial institutions, and now also allows payments to be made and received in cryptoassets.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The updated licence introduces a formal definition of cryptoassets as digitally secured representations of value using distributed ledger technology, and establishes a new reporting requirement: any cryptoasset payments made or received under the licence must be reported within 14 days of the end of each calendar month.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>Switzerland Adopts EU&#039;s 20th Russia Sanctions Package, Banning Russian Crypto Assets and Adding 115 Designations</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/tdr4g146u1-switzerland-adopts-eus-20th-russia-sanct</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/tdr4g146u1-switzerland-adopts-eus-20th-russia-sanct?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 20:57:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6334-3365-4433-b732-383061646234/photo-1612263997742-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>Switzerland aligned with the EU's 20th Russia sanctions package, designating 115 individuals and entities, expanding vessel and bank transaction bans, and prohibiting three Russian crypto assets.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Switzerland Adopts EU's 20th Russia Sanctions Package, Banning Russian Crypto Assets and Adding 115 Designations</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6334-3365-4433-b732-383061646234/photo-1612263997742-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Switzerland Adopts EU's 20th Russia Sanctions Package, Banning Russian Crypto Assets and Adding 115 Designations</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">Switzerland has amended its 2022 regulation on measures relating to the situation in Ukraine, aligning with the European Union's 20th Russia sanctions package.<br /><br />The key measures include:<br /><br /><strong>Designations.</strong> 115 people and entities have been added to the Swiss sanctions list, targeting individuals and organisations connected to Russia's military-industrial complex and energy sector, as well as those involved in sanctions circumvention, cultural appropriation in occupied Ukraine, propaganda, and the deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children.<br /><br /><strong>Vessel restrictions.</strong> 46 vessels are now subject to bans on purchase, sale, and related services. Bans on 11 previously listed vessels have been lifted. Additionally, 2 Russian ports and 1 third-country port are now subject to a transaction ban.<br /><br /><strong>Financial sector.</strong> 20 Russian banks and 7 financial intermediaries operating in third countries are now subject to a transaction ban.<br /><br /><strong>Crypto asset prohibitions.</strong> From 26 May 2026, transactions involving three Russian crypto assets are banned: <strong>A7A5</strong> — a stablecoin collateralised by state-owned Promsvyazbank — <strong>RUBx</strong>, and the <strong>Digital Ruble</strong>.<br /><br /><strong>Export controls.</strong> 60 additional companies are now subject to stricter export control measures.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Switzerland has chosen not to adopt 7 third-country company listings that were included in the EU package.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>Poland Sanctions 7 Crypto and Fintech Entities Enabling Russia to Bypass EU Financial Restrictions</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/2pnnyop9a1-poland-sanctions-7-crypto-and-fintech-en</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/2pnnyop9a1-poland-sanctions-7-crypto-and-fintech-en?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 01:18:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3131-3934-4032-a465-313435623764/istockphoto-21979875.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>Poland added 7 cryptocurrency and fintech entities to its autonomous Russia sanctions list for facilitating fund transfers between Russia and the EU in circumvention of existing sanctions.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Poland Sanctions 7 Crypto and Fintech Entities Enabling Russia to Bypass EU Financial Restrictions</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3131-3934-4032-a465-313435623764/istockphoto-21979875.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Poland Sanctions 7 Crypto and Fintech Entities Enabling Russia to Bypass EU Financial Restrictions</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">Poland has designated 7 entities under its autonomous Russia sanctions list established by the Sanctions Act, targeting a network of cryptocurrency and fintech companies alleged to have enabled Russian citizens to move funds between Russia and the European Union in violation of existing sanctions. None of the entities were previously subject to EU-level designations.<br /><br />Three of the designations target companies operating under the <strong>Mercuryo</strong> brand, managed by Cyprus-based <strong>MRCR Holdings Ltd</strong>:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>MoneyAmber UAB</strong> (Lithuania)</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Moneysail doo</strong> (Croatia)</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>MoneySwap OU</strong> (Estonia)</li></ul><br />Polish payment company <strong>Quicko sp. z o. o.</strong> and its Russian subsidiary <strong>OOO Quicko</strong> have also been designated. Quicko's operating licence was revoked by Poland's Financial Supervision Authority in January 2026.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The remaining two designations cover <strong>UAB Trustee Global</strong>, a Lithuanian crypto platform, and <strong>OOO Koshelek.ru</strong>, a Russian cryptocurrency exchange.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>US Targets Iran&#039;s Oil Network: Vessel Managers, Petrochemical Traders and Military Front Companies Sanctioned</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/phm3bfyk81-us-targets-irans-oil-network-vessel-mana</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/phm3bfyk81-us-targets-irans-oil-network-vessel-mana?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:58:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3933-3061-4739-b738-353430333532/premium_photo-166196.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US designated a broad network of companies and vessels involved in Iranian oil trade, including 8 vessel managers, 3 petrochemical traders, and 5 Hong Kong-based military front companies.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Targets Iran's Oil Network: Vessel Managers, Petrochemical Traders and Military Front Companies Sanctioned</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3933-3061-4739-b738-353430333532/premium_photo-166196.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Targets Iran's Oil Network: Vessel Managers, Petrochemical Traders and Military Front Companies Sanctioned</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has imposed sanctions on an extensive network of companies, vessels, and one individual connected to the trade and transport of Iranian oil and petrochemical products, with designations issued jointly by the State Department and OFAC.<br /><br /><strong>State Department — vessel managers and traders (EO 13846)</strong><br /><br />The State Department designated 8 vessel management companies, including:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Ever Shining Limited</strong> (Hong Kong)</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Seafoam Marine Ltd</strong> (UAE)</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Symphony Shipping and Maritime Management Inc</strong> (UAE)</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Vanguard Marine Ventures Inc</strong> (UAE)</li></ul><br />Eight vessels associated with these companies were identified as blocked property.<br /><br />Three petrochemical trading companies were also designated:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Classy Pansy Trading and Contracting WLL</strong> (Qatar)</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Alt Capital Pte. Ltd</strong> (Singapore)</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Rishabh Triexim LLP</strong> (India), along with its principal executive officer <strong>Swaroop Jayantilal Bagrecha</strong></li></ul><strong>OFAC — military front companies (EO 13224)</strong><br /><br />OFAC designated 5 Hong Kong-based front companies linked to <strong>Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company</strong> — the oil sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Growth Trading Co., Limited</li><li data-list="bullet">Damai Technology Development Limited</li><li data-list="bullet">Tida Co., Limited</li><li data-list="bullet">Mehdiyev Trading Co., Limited</li><li data-list="bullet">Worth Seen Energy Limited</li><li data-list="bullet"></li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>OFAC Publishes New Introductory Guide to US Sanctions: Who Must Comply and How</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/brom4itpt1-ofac-publishes-new-introductory-guide-to</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/brom4itpt1-ofac-publishes-new-introductory-guide-to?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 08:45:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3061-3061-4062-b431-386666383364/photo-1704969724221-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US Office of Foreign Assets Control released a practical introduction to OFAC sanctions, covering the five types of sanctions, compliance requirements, screening obligations, and civil penalties.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>OFAC Publishes New Introductory Guide to US Sanctions: Who Must Comply and How</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3061-3061-4062-b431-386666383364/photo-1704969724221-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">OFAC Publishes New Introductory Guide to US Sanctions: Who Must Comply and How</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published a new introductory guide explaining how its sanctions programmes operate and what is required to comply with them.<br /><br />The guide addresses the following key areas:<br /><br /><strong>Types of sanctions.</strong> OFAC administers five categories: list-based, government or regime-based, broad jurisdiction-based, sectoral, and secondary sanctions.<br /><br /><strong>Who must comply.</strong> The obligations apply to all US citizens and permanent residents, all individuals and entities physically located in the United States, and all US-incorporated entities including their foreign branches. Certain non-US persons may also fall within scope — notably foreign entities owned or controlled by US persons.<br /><br /><strong>How to comply.</strong> OFAC recommends building a risk-based compliance programme structured around five components: management commitment, risk assessment, internal controls, testing and auditing, and training.<br /><br /><strong>Sanctions screening.</strong> Organisations are expected to screen customers, counterparties, and transactions against OFAC lists. Where a potential match is identified, the organisation must determine whether to block, reject, or proceed with the transaction.<br /><br /><strong>Reporting.</strong> Blocked property must be reported to OFAC within 10 business days. Annual reports of all blocked property are due by 30 September each year.<br /><br /><strong>Recordkeeping.</strong> All relevant records must be retained for 10 years from the date of the transaction, or 10 years from the date the property is unblocked.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Penalties.</strong> OFAC applies a strict liability standard. As of 15 January 2025, the maximum civil penalty per breach of IEEPA stood at $377,700. Voluntary self-disclosure may reduce a proposed penalty by up to 50%.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>Germany&#039;s Sanctions Enforcement Office Reports Triple Rise in Tips and 183 New Investigations in 2025</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/klzlvkm7r1-germanys-sanctions-enforcement-office-re</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/klzlvkm7r1-germanys-sanctions-enforcement-office-re?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:39:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3836-3335-4562-b363-366532663061/photo-1603787935137-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>Germany's Central Office for Sanctions Enforcement published its 2025 annual report, recording 224 anonymous tips — triple the 2024 figure — and initiating 183 investigative proceedings during the year.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Germany's Sanctions Enforcement Office Reports Triple Rise in Tips and 183 New Investigations in 2025</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3836-3335-4562-b363-366532663061/photo-1603787935137-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Germany's Sanctions Enforcement Office Reports Triple Rise in Tips and 183 New Investigations in 2025</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">Germany's Central Office for Sanctions Enforcement (Zentralstelle für Sanktionsdurchsetzung — ZfS) has released its annual statistics report for 2025. Established in 2023 as Directorate XI of the General Customs Directorate, the office is responsible for enforcing financial sanctions against individuals and entities listed under EU legal acts.<br /><br />Key findings from the report:<br /><br /><strong>Anonymous tips tripled.</strong> The office received 224 anonymous reports related to sanctions enforcement or potential violations through its tip intake unit — three times the number recorded in 2024. Of these, 31 triggered administrative asset investigation proceedings, 145 were referred to other competent authorities, and 1 was forwarded to prosecution authorities.<br /><br /><strong>Asset reporting.</strong> The office received 20 reports concerning funds or economic resources held in Germany by listed persons, 8 of which led to the opening of investigative proceedings.<br /><br /><strong>Investigative activity.</strong> The ZfS initiated 183 new investigative proceedings during the year, concluded 195, and continues to actively investigate 189 open cases.<br /><br /><strong>Asset seizures.</strong> Eight asset seizures were carried out under sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the German Sanctions Enforcement Act (SanktDG).<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>International cooperation.</strong> The office received 7 and sent 15 international mutual assistance requests, reflecting its growing role in cross-border sanctions enforcement.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>US Sanctions Iranian LPG Smuggling Network Using UAE Front Companies and Fake Origin Declarations</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/t38yalh4n1-us-sanctions-iranian-lpg-smuggling-netwo</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/t38yalh4n1-us-sanctions-iranian-lpg-smuggling-netwo?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:44:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3930-6264-4636-b066-323035376335/photo-1735405680959-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US designated 4 people, 10 entities, and 6 vessels involved in smuggling Iranian LPG under false Omani origin labels, and facilitating foreign currency transactions for sanctioned Iranian banks.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Sanctions Iranian LPG Smuggling Network Using UAE Front Companies and Fake Origin Declarations</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3930-6264-4636-b066-323035376335/photo-1735405680959-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Sanctions Iranian LPG Smuggling Network Using UAE Front Companies and Fake Origin Declarations</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has sanctioned 4 individuals, 10 entities, and 6 vessels under Executive Order 13902, targeting a network engaged in the smuggling of Iranian liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and the facilitation of foreign currency transactions on behalf of sanctioned Iranian financial institutions.<br /><br /><strong>LPG smuggling network.</strong> Afghan national <strong>Sarbaz Abdul Zada</strong> and Turkish national <strong>Mohammad Shakol Mihandoust</strong> operated a network of UAE-based front companies that exported millions of barrels of Iranian-origin LPG to buyers across South and East Asia, falsely representing the cargo as Omani in origin. Three front companies used in the scheme were designated: <strong>Butani Trading LLC</strong>, <strong>Dundlod Trading FZE</strong>, and <strong>ADH Energy FZE</strong> — all based in the UAE. Six LPG tankers used to transport the cargo were also identified and blocked.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Iranian exchange house.</strong> <strong>Mehrdad Geramian Nik and Partners Company</strong>, an Iran-based currency exchange operation, was designated for moving hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign currency on behalf of sanctioned Iranian banks, including Bank Tejarat, Bank Mellat, and Bank Pasargad. The two individuals who operate the exchange house — <strong>Mehrdad Geramian Nik</strong> and <strong>Romina Geramian Nik</strong> — were also personally designated.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>Russian Court Blocks Enforcement of €248M LCIA Awards Against Rusal and RTI, Citing Public Policy</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/kof37m5581-russian-court-blocks-enforcement-of-248m</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/kof37m5581-russian-court-blocks-enforcement-of-248m?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 20:45:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3933-3937-4463-b332-393838313531/photo-1668776902200-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>A Russian arbitration court refused to recognise LCIA awards totalling €248M against Rusal and RTI, ruling that enforcement would amount to expropriation and that UK arbitration lacked impartiality.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Russian Court Blocks Enforcement of €248M LCIA Awards Against Rusal and RTI, Citing Public Policy</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3933-3937-4463-b332-393838313531/photo-1668776902200-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Russian Court Blocks Enforcement of €248M LCIA Awards Against Rusal and RTI, Citing Public Policy</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The Arbitrazh Court of the Kaliningrad Region has declined to recognise and enforce in Russia two LCIA arbitration awards issued in <em>OWH v RTI &amp; Rusal</em> (case No. A21-4252/2026) — the same awards that the English Commercial Court had previously upheld against a sanctions-based set-aside challenge in <em>OWH v Rusal</em>.<br /><br /><strong>Background.</strong> Following the imposition of EU, UK, and US sanctions on VTB Bank in 2022, OWH — VTB's German subsidiary — was placed under the control of special representatives appointed by BaFin, Germany's financial regulator, and subsequently entered liquidation. OWH terminated currency swap contracts with RTI, a Jersey-based subsidiary of Rusal, which had refused to perform its obligations citing sanctions. OWH obtained LCIA awards totalling approximately €248 million against RTI and Rusal as guarantor.<br /><br /><strong>Why Russian court involvement was needed.</strong> Under Russian counter-sanctions law (Presidential Decree No. 95 of 5 March 2022), payments to creditors from "unfriendly" states must be routed into restricted rouble accounts inaccessible to the foreign creditor. For Rusal to pay OWH directly, it required a Russian Government permit — which in turn required a Russian court ruling confirming that enforcement did not contradict Russian law. Rusal itself brought the recognition application for this purpose.<br /><strong>Grounds for refusal.</strong> The court declined recognition on Russian public policy grounds, finding that:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">BaFin's appointment of special representatives effectively transferred control of OWH to German state oversight — an act implementing Western sanctions against Russian entities. Enforcing the awards would therefore amount to expropriation of Russian assets</li><li data-list="bullet">OWH had terminated the contracts at the moment of maximum dollar appreciation, acting in accordance with Western sanctions policy rather than in the interests of its Russian shareholders, thereby maximising the claim against Rusal</li><li data-list="bullet">The UK-seated arbitration could not guarantee impartial proceedings for Russian parties, given the UK's sanctions posture toward Russia</li></ul><br />As a result, OWH cannot enforce the awards against Rusal's Russian assets, and Rusal remains unable to obtain the government permit needed to pay OWH outside Russia's counter-sanctions framework.</div>]]>
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			<title>Hong Kong Court Enforces €30M LCIA Award Against Canadian Bank Despite Sanctioned Ownership Claim</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/jxzocio2f1-hong-kong-court-enforces-30m-lcia-award</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/jxzocio2f1-hong-kong-court-enforces-30m-lcia-award?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 13:39:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6233-3430-4964-b739-313233306266/istockphoto-21944455.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>The Hong Kong High Court ordered enforcement of an LCIA award against a Canadian bank in favour of a Russian nickel producer, ruling that Canadian sanctions do not apply in Hong Kong jurisdiction.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Hong Kong Court Enforces €30M LCIA Award Against Canadian Bank Despite Sanctioned Ownership Claim</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6233-3430-4964-b739-313233306266/istockphoto-21944455.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Hong Kong Court Enforces €30M LCIA Award Against Canadian Bank Despite Sanctioned Ownership Claim</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The Hong Kong High Court has ruled that an LCIA arbitration award against a Canadian bank, issued in favour of a Russian nickel producer whose majority shareholders are subject to Canadian sanctions, can be enforced in Hong Kong (<em>A Company v The Bank</em> [2026] HKCFI 3169).<br /><br /><strong>Background.</strong> In 2021, an engineering company obtained bank guarantees from the Canadian bank, secured against a contract to carry out works at the Russian company's production facility. Canada subsequently sanctioned four individuals who collectively hold over 50% of the company's shares. When the engineering company refused to refund advance payments, the Russian company demanded payment under the guarantees. The bank refused, citing Canadian sanctions obligations.<br /><br /><strong>Arbitration outcome.</strong> The company initiated LCIA arbitration in London. The tribunal found that the bank had not demonstrated that making payment would constitute a breach of Canada's Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), as the individual shareholdings could not be aggregated to establish deemed ownership of the company under section 2.1 of SEMA. The tribunal awarded €30 million plus interest.<br /><strong>Hong Kong enforcement proceedings.</strong> The company sought to enforce the award against the bank's Hong Kong assets. The bank resisted, arguing that Canada's sanctions authority (GAC) had refused to grant a licence for payment — assessing the company as being in the deemed ownership of a sanctioned person — and that enforcement therefore created a real risk of criminal prosecution for the bank and its staff.<br /><br />The Court applied the "real risk of prosecution" test from the English High Court's judgment in <em>O v C</em> and ordered enforcement, holding that:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">GAC's licence refusal did not establish a real prosecution risk, as it did not override the tribunal's conclusion that payment was lawful under SEMA</li><li data-list="bullet">Enforcement could be achieved through court orders directing third parties to pay directly from the bank's Hong Kong accounts, without requiring any voluntary act by the bank, and would therefore be unlikely to trigger Canadian criminal liability</li><li data-list="bullet">The bank's own efforts to obtain GAC approval made actual prosecution in Canada unlikely in any event</li><li data-list="bullet">Canadian sanctions have no application in Hong Kong and therefore do not engage Hong Kong public policy</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>Two Men Convicted at Southwark Crown Court for Illegally Brokering Weapons Deals Across Africa</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/3auuxdovt1-two-men-convicted-at-southwark-crown-cou</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/3auuxdovt1-two-men-convicted-at-southwark-crown-cou?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2026 19:13:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6337-3066-4931-b338-336430346162/photo-1749671232689-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>David Greenhalgh and Christos Farmakis were convicted of brokering unlicensed weapons deals supplying ex-Soviet arms to Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya between 2009 and 2016 using forged end-user certificates.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Two Men Convicted at Southwark Crown Court for Illegally Brokering Weapons Deals Across Africa</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6337-3066-4931-b338-336430346162/photo-1749671232689-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Two Men Convicted at Southwark Crown Court for Illegally Brokering Weapons Deals Across Africa</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">Two men have been found guilty at Southwark Crown Court of brokering illegal weapons transactions without the required UK trade control licences, in a prosecution brought under the Export Control Order 2008 by HMRC's Fraud Investigation Service and the Crown Prosecution Service.<br /><br /><strong>David Greenhalgh</strong>, a UK national, brokered the supply of ex-Soviet aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, anti-tank missiles, and thousands of assault rifles to buyers in Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya between 2009 and 2016. He operated through his "Airservices" group of companies, incorporated across multiple jurisdictions in a deliberate attempt to move transactions outside UK legal reach. The court confirmed that this strategy was ineffective: as a UK national, Greenhalgh remained subject to UK trade controls regardless of where his deals were structured or executed.<br /><br />His business partner, Greek national <strong>Christos Farmakis</strong>, was convicted on the same date — 11 June 2026. Both defendants sourced weapons from defence ministries in former Soviet and Soviet-aligned states, and used forged end-user certificates to conceal the true destinations of the shipments. Sentencing is scheduled for 22 July.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Compliance note.</strong> The case serves as a clear reminder that UK trade controls apply to UK nationals globally. Routing transactions through overseas subsidiaries or foreign-registered entities does not remove UK jurisdiction.</li></ul></div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Renews General Licences for Sakhalin-2 Oil Exports and Civil Nuclear Transactions with Russian Banks</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/m4pjgptk41-us-renews-general-licences-for-sakhalin</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/m4pjgptk41-us-renews-general-licences-for-sakhalin?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 14:47:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3464-6163-4831-a330-666530363636/photo-1648369684556-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US updated two Russia-related general licences, extending authorisation for Sakhalin-2 crude oil transport to Japan and civil nuclear energy transactions with Gazprombank, Sberbank and VTB until December 2026.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Renews General Licences for Sakhalin-2 Oil Exports and Civil Nuclear Transactions with Russian Banks</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3464-6163-4831-a330-666530363636/photo-1648369684556-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Renews General Licences for Sakhalin-2 Oil Exports and Civil Nuclear Transactions with Russian Banks</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has issued updated versions of two Russia-related general licences and amended eight associated FAQs, maintaining carve-outs for specific energy and nuclear transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under US sanctions.<br /><br /><strong>GL 55F</strong> replaces GL 55E and authorises transactions related to the maritime transport of crude oil produced at the Sakhalin-2 project, on the condition that the Sakhalin-2 by-product is destined solely for importation into Japan. The licence also covers certain transactions involving Gazprombank and other dealings otherwise prohibited under Executive Order 14071. It expires on 18 December 2026.<br /><br /><strong>GL 115D</strong> replaces GL 115C and authorises transactions with sanctioned Russian financial institutions — including Gazprombank, Sberbank, and VTB Bank — where those transactions relate to civil nuclear energy. The licence covers activity undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear projects that were initiated before 21 November 2024, and similarly expires on 18 December 2026.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">OFAC also updated FAQs 967, 978, 999, 1011, 1117, 1182, 1203, and 1216 in connection with the revised licences.</li></ul></div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US and Iran Agree Ceasefire Extension with Sanctions Relief and Strait of Hormuz Reopening</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/o6bnbpyfp1-us-and-iran-agree-ceasefire-extension-wi</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/o6bnbpyfp1-us-and-iran-agree-ceasefire-extension-wi?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 01:58:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3036-3664-4939-b362-633662383462/photo-1772308260590-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US and Iran have agreed a draft MOU to be signed in Switzerland on 19 June 2026, including a freeze on new sanctions, lifting of existing measures, and release of US$25 billion in frozen Iranian assets.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US and Iran Agree Ceasefire Extension with Sanctions Relief and Strait of Hormuz Reopening</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3036-3664-4939-b362-633662383462/photo-1772308260590-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US and Iran Agree Ceasefire Extension with Sanctions Relief and Strait of Hormuz Reopening</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States and Iran have reached a draft agreement to extend their ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The deal will take the form of a memorandum of understanding (MOU), to be signed in Switzerland on 19 June 2026, with Pakistan and Qatar having served as mediators. A comprehensive final agreement is to be negotiated over the following 60 days.<br /><br />The full text of the MOU has not been made public, but according to reporting by Reuters, the draft includes the following commitments:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Iran will immediately reopen the Strait of Hormuz</li><li data-list="bullet">The US will impose no new sanctions on Iran pending conclusion of a final deal</li><li data-list="bullet">The US and UN will lift all sanctions on Iran according to an agreed timetable</li><li data-list="bullet">The US will waive oil sanctions on Iran by granting licences permitting Iran to buy and sell oil on international markets</li><li data-list="bullet">The US will release US$25 billion in frozen Iranian assets through cash transfers, regional financial cooperation, and credit lines</li><li data-list="bullet">Iran's nuclear programme will be addressed in the final agreement</li></ul><br />The Financial Times has additionally reported that Iran will not charge tolls for passage through the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days while the final agreement is being confirmed, and that all uranium will be diluted on site under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision as a minimum commitment.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The UK, France, Germany, and Italy have issued a joint statement indicating their readiness to lift relevant sanctions on Iran in response to clear and verifiable steps on its nuclear programme. UN sanctions on Iran were reinstated in October 2025 after the UK, France, and Germany triggered the snapback mechanism under the 2015 nuclear deal.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>UK Sanctions 72 Ships, Entities and Individuals Targeting Russia&#039;s Oil Trade and Defence Procurement</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/941jerua21-uk-sanctions-72-ships-entities-and-indiv</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/941jerua21-uk-sanctions-72-ships-entities-and-indiv?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 14:23:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3032-6332-4337-b166-613734363537/istockphoto-14046997.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>The UK designated 27 ships, 31 entities, and 14 individuals linked to Russia's oil trade, LNG exports, defence procurement, and sanctions circumvention networks, bringing its total shadow fleet designations to over 600.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK Sanctions 72 Ships, Entities and Individuals Targeting Russia's Oil Trade and Defence Procurement</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3032-6332-4337-b166-613734363537/istockphoto-14046997.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK Sanctions 72 Ships, Entities and Individuals Targeting Russia's Oil Trade and Defence Procurement</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United Kingdom has imposed a new round of sanctions targeting Russia's oil trade and defence sector, specifying 27 vessels and designating 31 entities and 14 individuals.<br /><br />The designations cover a broad range of actors and activities:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>GRU-linked procurement networks</strong> — officers and front companies of Russia's Main Intelligence Unit involved in sourcing dual-use goods for the Russian defence sector</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>LNG shipping</strong> — vessels engaged in transporting Russian Liquefied Natural Gas to third countries</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Dual-use goods supply chains</strong> — entities facilitating the supply of controlled goods to Russia</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Transport sector proxies</strong> — entities acting on behalf of already-designated individuals operating in Russia's transport industry</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Financial connectivity</strong> — entities supporting Russia's invasion of Ukraine and helping connect its financial sector to global markets</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Energy sector support</strong> — entities providing material support to Russia's broader energy infrastructure</li></ul><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UK has now sanctioned over 600 shadow fleet and Russian LNG vessels in total.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>EU General Court Upholds Russia Sanctions on Gennady and Elena Timchenko, Rejecting All Delisting Grounds</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/6i1idvdmz1-eu-general-court-upholds-russia-sanction</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/6i1idvdmz1-eu-general-court-upholds-russia-sanction?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 21:29:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6333-3662-4835-a639-353331643662/istockphoto-21765164.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>The EU General Court dismissed Gennady and Elena Timchenko's challenges to their 2024 and 2025 Russia sanctions relistings, confirming the legality of both designations and rejecting procedural objections.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU General Court Upholds Russia Sanctions on Gennady and Elena Timchenko, Rejecting All Delisting Grounds</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6333-3662-4835-a639-353331643662/istockphoto-21765164.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">EU General Court Upholds Russia Sanctions on Gennady and Elena Timchenko, Rejecting All Delisting Grounds</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The EU General Court has rejected applications by Gennady Timchenko and his wife Elena Timchenko to annul their September 2024 and March 2025 relistings on the EU Russia sanctions list.<br /><br /><strong>Gennady Timchenko (Case T-603/24)</strong><br /><br />Mr Timchenko was originally listed in February 2022 under criteria covering support for actions undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity and benefiting from Russian decision-makers responsible for destabilisation of Ukraine. He was relisted in March and September 2024 and again in March 2025 on the same grounds, with the additional criterion of being a "leading businessperson in Russia." This was his fourth delisting attempt before the General Court, and it was rejected on the same basis as his previous three applications. The Court declined once again to examine the legality of criterion (g), finding that criterion (d) alone was sufficient to justify the listing.<br /><br /><strong>Elena Timchenko (Case T-602/24)</strong><br /><br />Mrs Timchenko has been listed since February 2022 for being "associated with" her husband, and has been relisted multiple times on the same grounds. The Court rejected her arguments for broadly the same reasons as her earlier applications. Key findings included:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The concept of "association" under EU sanctions extends beyond family relationships and encompasses broader links to a designated person</li><li data-list="bullet">Her resignation from the Timchenko Foundation did not sever her connection to the designation, as it occurred after the relevant acts were passed and she remains a founder and active participant in the Foundation</li><li data-list="bullet">The argument that Russian law requires founders to retain minimum powers merely confirmed — rather than undermined — the continuing relevance of her status</li></ul><br /><strong>Procedural challenge dismissed</strong><br /><br />Both applicants raised a new argument that the March 2025 relistings were procedurally invalid because their files were reviewed not by the Council directly, but by preparatory bodies including Coreper and working groups. The Court rejected this, confirming that Coreper's preparatory role is a standard feature of EU legislative procedure under Article 19 of the Council's Rules of Procedure, and that notifications drafted by Coreper remain subject to Council challenge at any stage.<br /><br /><strong>Damages claims rejected</strong><br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The Court dismissed Mr Timchenko's claim for reputational damage, finding no evidence of real and certain loss sufficient to establish non-contractual EU liability. Mrs Timchenko's damages claim was also rejected, as she failed to demonstrate that the contested acts were unlawful.</li></ul></div>]]>
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			<title>EU Sanctions Criminalisation Directive: Three Member States Face Escalated Infringement Proceedings</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/o54zlv65b1-eu-sanctions-criminalisation-directive-t</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/o54zlv65b1-eu-sanctions-criminalisation-directive-t?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 12:08:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3264-3536-4435-a438-373865613436/photo-1608817576152-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The European Commission has escalated infringement proceedings against Spain, France, and Austria for failing to transpose the EU sanctions criminalisation directive, while 9 procedures remain ongoing.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU Sanctions Criminalisation Directive: Three Member States Face Escalated Infringement Proceedings</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3264-3536-4435-a438-373865613436/photo-1608817576152-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">EU Sanctions Criminalisation Directive: Three Member States Face Escalated Infringement Proceedings</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">Directive (EU) 2024/1226 — which establishes criminal offences and penalties for the violation or circumvention of EU sanctions — entered into force on 19 May 2024, with a transposition deadline of 20 May 2025 for all EU member states.<br /><br />The Directive requires member states to introduce criminal penalties for sanctions violations committed through specific conduct, setting out minimum penalties and limitation periods. Member states retain discretion over whether to criminalise prohibited conduct involving funds, goods, or services valued at less than €10,000.<br /><br />Following the missed deadline, the European Commission launched infringement procedures in July 2025 against 18 member states by issuing letters of formal notice. The current status of those proceedings is as follows:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>6 procedures closed</strong> — Germany, Cyprus, Portugal, Romania, and Croatia have successfully transposed the Directive and their cases have been resolved</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>3 procedures escalated</strong> — Spain, France, and Austria have each received a reasoned opinion, representing a formal escalation of the infringement process</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>9 procedures ongoing</strong> — Italy, Czechia, Hungary, and Malta are among those that have adopted domestic transposing legislation since proceedings were initiated, though their cases remain open</li></ul><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The Commission has not initiated infringement procedures against Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, or Luxembourg.</li></ul></div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>EU&#039;s Top Court Dismisses Belaruskali, Its Director and Export Arm&#039;s Appeals Against Belarus Sanctions</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/tc8sf12kg1-eus-top-court-dismisses-belaruskali-its</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/tc8sf12kg1-eus-top-court-dismisses-belaruskali-its?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 12:29:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3332-6234-4630-a233-393230653039/premium_photo-167056.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The Court of Justice of the EU dismissed three appeals by Belaruskali, its director-general Ivan Golovaty, and the Belarusian Potash Company, upholding their 2022 listings for supporting the Lukashenko regime.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU's Top Court Dismisses Belaruskali, Its Director and Export Arm's Appeals Against Belarus Sanctions</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3332-6234-4630-a233-393230653039/premium_photo-167056.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">EU's Top Court Dismisses Belaruskali, Its Director and Export Arm's Appeals Against Belarus Sanctions</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has dismissed three appeals against General Court judgments that had previously rejected annulment applications brought by state-owned potash producer <strong>Belaruskali AAT</strong>, its director-general <strong>Ivan Golovaty</strong>, and its exporting arm <strong>the Belarusian Potash Company (BPC)</strong> — joined cases C-816/24 P to C-818/24 P.<br /><br />All three were listed in June 2022 under Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 for supporting the Lukashenko regime:<br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Belaruskali</strong> was designated as a state-owned enterprise that repressed Belarusian civil society by dismissing workers who protested against the regime, and for paying dividends to the Belarusian state</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Ivan Golovaty</strong> was listed in his capacity as director-general and for his personal role in the dismissal of protesting workers</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>BPC</strong> was designated as Belaruskali's export arm, which received preferential treatment from the Belarusian state and generated substantial revenue for the regime</li></ul><br />The appellants challenged both their 2022 listings and their 2023 relistings, arguing that the Belarusian government does not fall within the definition of the "Lukashenko regime" — and that paying money to the state therefore cannot constitute regime support — and that the General Court had incorrectly found that they benefited from or supported the regime.<br /><br />The CJEU dismissed all three appeals, ruling that:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The Belarusian State falls squarely within the definition of the Lukashenko regime, as the individuals who make up the regime and those who run the state and government are effectively indistinguishable</li><li data-list="bullet">Although the General Court had incorrectly characterised Belaruskali as Belarus's sole potash producer, its listing remained lawful due to the dividends it paid to the state and the significant revenues it generated in a sector under regime control</li><li data-list="bullet">Mr Golovaty's listing was lawful given that President Lukashenko personally appointed him, instructed him to increase Belaruskali's support for the state, and that he held senior positions and benefited from his place within the regime</li><li data-list="bullet">BPC's listing was lawful because its export activities and the preferential state treatment it received made it a direct source of revenue for the regime</li><li data-list="bullet"></li></ul></div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Issues General Licence X Authorising Iranian Oil Transactions Ahead of Ceasefire Deal</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/jxnp2t1ne1-us-issues-general-licence-x-authorising</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/jxnp2t1ne1-us-issues-general-licence-x-authorising?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2026 15:25:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6532-6262-4937-b766-316630626665/photo-1772303142787-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US issued Iran-related General Licence X, authorising transactions necessary for the production, sale, and delivery of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products, including on US-sanctioned vessels.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Issues General Licence X Authorising Iranian Oil Transactions Ahead of Ceasefire Deal</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6532-6262-4937-b766-316630626665/photo-1772303142787-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Issues General Licence X Authorising Iranian Oil Transactions Ahead of Ceasefire Deal</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has issued Iran-related General Licence X, broadening the scope of permitted transactions connected to Iranian oil and petrochemical trade — a significant development in the context of the ongoing US-Iran ceasefire negotiations.<br /><br />The licence authorises all transactions ordinarily necessary for the production, sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil, petrochemical products, and petroleum products of Iranian origin, including transactions involving US-sanctioned vessels.<br /><br />Covered transactions include:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Safe docking and anchoring of vessels carrying Iranian-origin cargo</li><li data-list="bullet">Crew health and safety measures</li><li data-list="bullet">Emergency repairs and vessel management services</li></ul><br />The licence applies to products produced by entities sanctioned under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, or the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations. Importers are permitted to bring covered products into the United States, and payments owed to Iran, the Government of Iran, or any US-sanctioned person may be settled in US dollar-denominated funds.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The licence explicitly excludes transactions involving North Korea, Cuba, and certain regions of Ukraine. It expires on 21 August 2026.</li></ul></div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>UK Parliament Launches Inquiry into Deterring Russian Aggression — Submissions Open Until 8 July</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/7e3cozlfa1-uk-parliament-launches-inquiry-into-dete</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/7e3cozlfa1-uk-parliament-launches-inquiry-into-dete?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 11:29:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6662-3665-4736-b063-323637343230/photo-1647006875983-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The UK has launched a cross-party parliamentary inquiry examining how to impose greater costs on Russia and strengthen deterrence in coordination with EU and NATO allies. Evidence accepted until 8 July 2026.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK Parliament Launches Inquiry into Deterring Russian Aggression — Submissions Open Until 8 July</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6662-3665-4736-b063-323637343230/photo-1647006875983-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK Parliament Launches Inquiry into Deterring Russian Aggression — Submissions Open Until 8 July</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United Kingdom has launched a parliamentary inquiry into the UK's approach to deterring Russian aggression, with a particular focus on the imposition of costs and constraints on Russia. The inquiry is chaired by MP Matt Western and convened by a cross-party group of parliamentarians tasked with scrutinising government policy in this area.<br /><br />The inquiry will examine four key questions:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The UK's capacity to impose costs and constraints sufficient to further deter Russian aggression</li><li data-list="bullet">How to alter the risk calculations of key elements of the Russian system, including its security apparatus</li><li data-list="bullet">What measures would enable more effective European deterrence of Russia</li><li data-list="bullet">How the UK can work with its EU and NATO allies to reinforce a coordinated deterrence posture</li></ul><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Evidence sessions were held on 15 and 22 June 2026. The inquiry is currently accepting written submissions from interested parties until <strong>8 July 2026</strong>.</li></ul></div>]]>
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		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Renews General Licences for Sakhalin-2 Oil Exports and Civil Nuclear Transactions with Russian Banks</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/rnht06stv1-us-renews-general-licences-for-sakhalin</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/rnht06stv1-us-renews-general-licences-for-sakhalin?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 10:21:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6362-3936-4030-b333-633362373633/premium_photo-170886.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US updated two Russia-related general licences, extending authorisation for Sakhalin-2 crude oil transport to Japan and civil nuclear energy transactions with Gazprombank, Sberbank and VTB until December 2026.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Renews General Licences for Sakhalin-2 Oil Exports and Civil Nuclear Transactions with Russian Banks</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6362-3936-4030-b333-633362373633/premium_photo-170886.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Renews General Licences for Sakhalin-2 Oil Exports and Civil Nuclear Transactions with Russian Banks</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has issued updated versions of two Russia-related general licences and amended eight associated FAQs, maintaining carve-outs for specific energy and nuclear transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under US sanctions.<br /><br /><strong>GL 55F</strong> replaces GL 55E and authorises transactions related to the maritime transport of crude oil produced at the Sakhalin-2 project, on the condition that the Sakhalin-2 by-product is destined solely for importation into Japan. The licence also covers certain transactions involving Gazprombank and other dealings otherwise prohibited under Executive Order 14071. It expires on 18 December 2026.<br /><br /><strong>GL 115D</strong> replaces GL 115C and authorises transactions with sanctioned Russian financial institutions — including Gazprombank, Sberbank, and VTB Bank — where those transactions relate to civil nuclear energy. The licence covers activity undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear projects that were initiated before 21 November 2024, and similarly expires on 18 December 2026.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">OFAC also updated FAQs 967, 978, 999, 1011, 1117, 1182, 1203, and 1216 in connection with the revised licences.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>UK Updates Grounds for Mikhail Fridman&#039;s Sanctions Designation to Include Petr Aven Association</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/2afbeocf11-uk-updates-grounds-for-mikhail-fridmans</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/2afbeocf11-uk-updates-grounds-for-mikhail-fridmans?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 22:38:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6331-6132-4933-a263-386562343032/photo-1718808993138-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The UK has amended the statement of reasons for Mikhail Fridman's Russia sanctions listing, adding his association with fellow Alfa Group-linked sanctioned individual Petr Aven as a designation ground.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK Updates Grounds for Mikhail Fridman's Sanctions Designation to Include Petr Aven Association</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6331-6132-4933-a263-386562343032/photo-1718808993138-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK Updates Grounds for Mikhail Fridman's Sanctions Designation to Include Petr Aven Association</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United Kingdom has amended the statement of reasons underpinning Mikhail Fridman's designation under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.<br /><br />Fridman was originally UK-sanctioned in 2022 on the basis of his role as a director of the Alfa Group, a major financial services conglomerate active in Russia's banking sector. The updated statement of reasons now additionally cites his association with <strong>Petr Aven</strong>, who is himself UK-sanctioned for his own links to the Alfa Group.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">The amendment reflects the UK's ongoing practice of reviewing and strengthening the evidentiary basis for existing designations, rather than introducing a new listing.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Renews General Licence for Lukoil International Sale Negotiations for the Seventh Time</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/xi730pyk11-us-renews-general-licence-for-lukoil-int</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/xi730pyk11-us-renews-general-licence-for-lukoil-int?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 15:47:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6162-3231-4537-a334-653638386630/istockphoto-12198127.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>The US issued General Licence 131G, extending authorisation for transactions related to the sale of Lukoil International GmbH until 25 July 2026, replacing GL 131F in its seventh consecutive renewal.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Renews General Licence for Lukoil International Sale Negotiations for the Seventh Time</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6162-3231-4537-a334-653638386630/istockphoto-12198127.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Renews General Licence for Lukoil International Sale Negotiations for the Seventh Time</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has issued General Licence 131G, extending the authorisation for transactions related to the negotiation and conclusion of contracts for the sale or transfer of Lukoil International GmbH (LIG) until 25 July 2026. This marks the seventh renewal of the licence since it was first issued following Lukoil's designation in October 2025.<br /><br />GL 131G replaces and supersedes GL 131F, which was due to expire on 27 June 2026. The licence was previously renewed on 1 June 2026.<br /><br />The licence continues to authorise all transactions ordinarily necessary for the negotiation of and entry into contracts with Lukoil for the sale, disposition, or transfer of LIG, provided that the performance of any such contract is made expressly contingent on receipt of separate OFAC authorisation. Transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under Executive Order 14024 are covered, however the licence cannot be used to transfer funds to any person or account located in Russia.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">OFAC has also updated FAQs 1224 and 1225, which provide further guidance on the LIG sale process, to reflect the terms of GL 131G. Per FAQ 1224, the licence may be revoked at any time if Lukoil or LIG are found not to be negotiating in good faith.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>UK Delists Libyan Arab African Investment Company from Russia Sanctions, Mirroring 2022 EU Decision</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/57smybnlh1-uk-delists-libyan-arab-african-investmen</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/57smybnlh1-uk-delists-libyan-arab-african-investmen?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 16:09:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3964-6464-4539-b362-323639366333/photo-1718808993138-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The UK removed the Libyan Arab African Investment Company from its sanctions list without providing reasons, four years after the EU General Court ordered its delisting for failing to meet the listing criteria.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK Delists Libyan Arab African Investment Company from Russia Sanctions, Mirroring 2022 EU Decision</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3964-6464-4539-b362-323639366333/photo-1718808993138-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK Delists Libyan Arab African Investment Company from Russia Sanctions, Mirroring 2022 EU Decision</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United Kingdom has delisted the Libyan Arab African Investment Company (LAAICO) from its sanctions list, following an official decision-making process.<br /><br />LAAICO was UK-designated in 2020 when the Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 came into force. Prior to that, it had already been subject to UK sanctions through the operation of the pre-Brexit EU sanctions regime under Regulation (EU) 2016/44, on the basis of its links to the former Gaddafi regime.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">No reasons were provided for the UK's decision to delist the company. Notably, the EU itself removed LAAICO from its own sanctions list back in 2022, after the EU General Court ruled in Case T-267/20 that the company did not meet the listing criteria set out under Regulation 2016/44.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>UK Sanctions 72 Ships, Entities and Individuals Targeting Russia&#039;s Oil Trade and Defence Procurement</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/7bn50dgck1-uk-sanctions-72-ships-entities-and-indiv</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/7bn50dgck1-uk-sanctions-72-ships-entities-and-indiv?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 20:03:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6235-6563-4033-b533-373239383061/istockphoto-22355466.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>The UK designated 27 ships, 31 entities, and 14 individuals linked to Russia's oil trade, LNG exports, defence procurement, and sanctions circumvention networks, bringing its total shadow fleet designations to over 600.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK Sanctions 72 Ships, Entities and Individuals Targeting Russia's Oil Trade and Defence Procurement</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6235-6563-4033-b533-373239383061/istockphoto-22355466.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK Sanctions 72 Ships, Entities and Individuals Targeting Russia's Oil Trade and Defence Procurement</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United Kingdom has imposed a new round of sanctions targeting Russia's oil trade and defence sector, specifying 27 vessels and designating 31 entities and 14 individuals.<br /><br />The designations cover a broad range of actors and activities:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>GRU-linked procurement networks</strong> — officers and front companies of Russia's Main Intelligence Unit involved in sourcing dual-use goods for the Russian defence sector</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>LNG shipping</strong> — vessels engaged in transporting Russian Liquefied Natural Gas to third countries</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Dual-use goods supply chains</strong> — entities facilitating the supply of controlled goods to Russia</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Transport sector proxies</strong> — entities acting on behalf of already-designated individuals operating in Russia's transport industry</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Financial connectivity</strong> — entities supporting Russia's invasion of Ukraine and helping connect its financial sector to global markets</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>Energy sector support</strong> — entities providing material support to Russia's broader energy infrastructure</li></ul><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UK has now sanctioned over 600 shadow fleet and Russian LNG vessels in total.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Terror Attack Victims Sue British American Tobacco Over Alleged North Korea Sanctions Violations Funding Missile Programme</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/a7os4tkkz1-us-terror-attack-victims-sue-british-ame</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/a7os4tkkz1-us-terror-attack-victims-sue-british-ame?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 11:41:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3835-3665-4637-b832-613265343262/photo-1584890309466-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>American victims of terrorist attacks in Iraq have filed a civil claim against BAT, alleging that revenues from its North Korea cigarette sales helped fund IRGC and Hizballah missiles used in the attacks.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Terror Attack Victims Sue British American Tobacco Over Alleged North Korea Sanctions Violations Funding Missile Programme</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3835-3665-4637-b832-613265343262/photo-1584890309466-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Terror Attack Victims Sue British American Tobacco Over Alleged North Korea Sanctions Violations Funding Missile Programme</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">American victims of terrorist attacks in Iraq have filed a civil complaint against British American Tobacco (BAT), alleging that the company knowingly provided material assistance to a North Korea–IRGC–Hizballah network responsible for producing the missiles used in those attacks.<br /><br />The claim follows the earlier dismissal of criminal charges against BAT for violating US sanctions by selling cigarettes to North Korea through its subsidiary BATMS. Those charges were dropped after BAT was found to have complied with the terms of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the US Department of Justice. The claimants now argue that BATMS's admission of guilt under the DPA demonstrates that BAT "wilfully conspired" with North Korean arms traffickers, and that the company is therefore liable for the attacks under 18 U.S. Code § 2333.<br /><br />The claimants' court filing sets out three central allegations:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">BAT's joint venture partner in North Korea was <strong>Office 39</strong> — not, as BAT has claimed, the North Korean Tobacco Company. Office 39 is US-sanctioned under Executive Order 13551 for involvement in illicit activities connected to North Korea</li><li data-list="bullet">Office 39 functioned as a procurement arm for the missile programmes of both the IRGC and Hizballah, both of which are designated terrorist organisations under US law</li><li data-list="bullet">Currency generated by BAT's North Korean operations was transferred to fund North Korea's arms programmes and the production of the missiles ultimately used in the terrorist attacks against the claimants</li><li data-list="bullet"></li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Renews General Licence 13R Permitting Limited Transactions with Russian Central Bank and Finance Ministry</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/vlkkxlrpz1-us-renews-general-licence-13r-permitting</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/vlkkxlrpz1-us-renews-general-licence-13r-permitting?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:08:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3034-3437-4864-a137-656562616432/photo-1673191710682-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US issued General Licence 13R, extending authorisation for transactions with Russia's Central Bank, National Wealth Fund, and Ministry of Finance necessary for US persons' day-to-day operations until 9 October 2026.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Renews General Licence 13R Permitting Limited Transactions with Russian Central Bank and Finance Ministry</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3034-3437-4864-a137-656562616432/photo-1673191710682-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Renews General Licence 13R Permitting Limited Transactions with Russian Central Bank and Finance Ministry</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has issued General Licence 13R, renewing authorisation for certain transactions involving the Russian Central Bank, the National Wealth Fund, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation that would otherwise be prohibited under Directive 4 of Executive Order 14024.<br /><br />The licence covers transactions that are necessary to support the day-to-day operations of US persons or businesses operating in Russia, and remains in effect until 9 October 2026.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">GL 13R replaces General Licence 13Q, which was last issued in April 2026. OFAC has also updated FAQs 999 and 1118 to reflect the terms of the renewed licence.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>UK National Crime Agency Seeks Permanent Confiscation of $357,000 from Russia-Sanctioned Individual</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/f2h64hlcc1-uk-national-crime-agency-seeks-permanent</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/f2h64hlcc1-uk-national-crime-agency-seeks-permanent?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:10:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3061-3031-4562-b665-663134636539/photo-1596290496141-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The NCA has filed a civil forfeiture application at Westminster Magistrates' Court to permanently confiscate $357,000 from UK-sanctioned Sergei Tregub, with a trial scheduled for March 2027.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK National Crime Agency Seeks Permanent Confiscation of $357,000 from Russia-Sanctioned Individual</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3061-3031-4562-b665-663134636539/photo-1596290496141-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK National Crime Agency Seeks Permanent Confiscation of $357,000 from Russia-Sanctioned Individual</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The UK's National Crime Agency (NCA) has brought a civil forfeiture application at Westminster Magistrates' Court seeking the permanent confiscation of funds worth $357,000 held by UK-sanctioned individual Sergei Sergeevich Tregub. Civil forfeiture applications of this kind can be pursued where funds are suspected of representing the proceeds of crime or are intended for use in unlawful conduct.<br /><br />Tregub was designated in 2023 under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 for being "associated with" his father, Sergei Vadimovich Tregub — himself sanctioned for owning contractor business Velesstroy, which operated across Russia's strategically significant construction and energy sectors.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">A trial to determine the outcome of the forfeiture application is scheduled to be heard in March 2027.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>Thailand Introduces Export Licensing Requirements for Dual-Use and Nuclear-Related Goods</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/j7s7mxmja1-thailand-introduces-export-licensing-req</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/j7s7mxmja1-thailand-introduces-export-licensing-req?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 22:10:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6333-3832-4163-a438-386337393031/istockphoto-22626840.webp" type="image/webp"/>
			<description>Thailand's Ministry of Commerce issued two announcements placing dual-use items under export control, requiring licences for nuclear-related goods in Category 0 from 30 July 2026 under its WMD proliferation law.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Thailand Introduces Export Licensing Requirements for Dual-Use and Nuclear-Related Goods</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6333-3832-4163-a438-386337393031/istockphoto-22626840.webp"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Thailand Introduces Export Licensing Requirements for Dual-Use and Nuclear-Related Goods</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">Thailand's Ministry of Commerce has issued two regulatory announcements bringing dual-use items under export licensing control, pursuant to the Control of Items Relating to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act B.E. 2562 (2019).<br /><br /><strong>First announcement</strong> designates the dual-use items requiring a licence to export or re-export from Thailand, taking effect on 30 July 2026. Controls apply to Category 0, covering nuclear-related goods, and specifically require licences for the following sub-categories as set out in Schedule 1 of Thailand's WMD List notification:<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet"><strong>0A</strong> — systems, equipment and components</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>0B</strong> — test, inspection and production equipment</li><li data-list="bullet"><strong>0C</strong> — materials</li></ul><br /><strong>Second announcement</strong> establishes the criteria, methods, and conditions for obtaining these licences. It took effect on 30 June 2026, allowing exporters to apply for licences in advance of the mandatory requirement coming into force.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">Exporters must apply through Thailand's Department of Foreign Trade via the e-TCWMD online system at etcwmd.dft.go.th, which also allows businesses to check whether their specific goods fall within the controlled list.</li></ul></div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>EU Targets Sudan&#039;s Gold Sector with New Sectoral Sanctions</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/hxzi6tjui1-eu-targets-sudans-gold-sector-with-new-s</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/hxzi6tjui1-eu-targets-sudans-gold-sector-with-new-s?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 19:30:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3933-3337-4636-b831-623735613633/photo-1610375461246-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The EU has expanded its Sudan sanctions regime, banning imports of Sudanese gold and prohibiting the supply of mining equipment, services and financing linked to gold extraction in the country.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU Targets Sudan's Gold Sector with New Sectoral Sanctions</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3933-3337-4636-b831-623735613633/photo-1610375461246-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">EU Targets Sudan's Gold Sector with New Sectoral Sanctions</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The European Union has significantly broadened its Sudan sanctions framework by adding sectoral restrictions aimed at the country's gold industry. Regulation (EU) 2026/1724, which amends the existing Regulation (EU) 2023/2147, introduces a set of far-reaching prohibitions.<br /><br />Under the new rules, it is now forbidden to purchase, import, or transfer gold of Sudanese origin if it has been exported from Sudan into the EU or into any third country after 15 July 2026.<br /><br />The amendment also bans the sale, supply, transfer, or export of goods that could be used for gold mining or exploitation in Sudan. Mercury and cyanide — key chemicals in gold processing — are explicitly covered by this restriction, although an exemption applies where these substances are used for humanitarian purposes.<br /><br />In addition, the EU has prohibited the provision of technical assistance, brokering, and other related services connected to gold or mining equipment, as well as any financial assistance or financing linked to gold extraction activities in Sudan.<br /><br /><ul><li data-list="bullet">According to the EU, gold has become one of the main revenue streams fuelling the armed conflict in Sudan, which erupted in 2023. Companies dealing in precious metals, mining supplies, or related financial services should review their exposure to Sudanese counterparties without delay.</li></ul></div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
		</item>
		<item turbo="true">
			<title>Canadian Court Halts Share Buyout Pending Sanctions Ownership Review</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/l1mn8jlay1-canadian-court-halts-share-buyout-pendin</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/l1mn8jlay1-canadian-court-halts-share-buyout-pendin?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 16:41:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3735-3862-4937-a636-316564393337/photo-1774915065730-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The Ontario Superior Court has put a court-ordered share buyout on hold until Canada's sanctions regulator determines whether the selling shareholder is controlled by a sanctioned Russian company.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>Canadian Court Halts Share Buyout Pending Sanctions Ownership Review</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3735-3862-4937-a636-316564393337/photo-1774915065730-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">Canadian Court Halts Share Buyout Pending Sanctions Ownership Review</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The Ontario Superior Court has ruled that a court-ordered share buyout cannot proceed until Global Affairs Canada (GAC), the country's sanctions authority, determines whether the selling shareholder is under the control of RESO — a Russian entity designated under the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations. The decision was issued in CLR Invest Ltd v Kondratiev, 2026 ONSC 3832.<br /><br />CLR, an investment company incorporated in Malta, owns a 14.5% stake in UCT, a medical technology firm based in Ontario. Following a dispute between shareholders, CLR turned to the court seeking an order requiring UCT to buy out its shares under Ontario corporate law and to set the price. CLR also filed an oppression application in an attempt to secure a higher buyout valuation. The court dismissed that application and ordered the buyout to proceed at ordinary fair value.<br /><br />Both sides had separately asked GAC to rule on whether CLR is "controlled" by RESO — a claim CLR rejects — and whether a "no prohibition" letter confirming the absence of such control would be appropriate. If the regulator concludes that CLR is indeed controlled by the designated Russian company, the shareholding would fall within the scope of Canada's Russia sanctions under s2.1(2) of the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA). In that case, any payment or transfer of funds to CLR in exchange for the shares would amount to a sanctions breach.<br /><br />The court noted there was evidence suggesting CLR might be controlled by RESO, but deliberately left this question to the regulator. As a result, no money can change hands and no shares can be transferred until GAC issues its determination.<br /><br />The case is a clear illustration of how sanctions-related ownership and control questions can freeze even routine corporate transactions — and why counterparty screening should extend to indirect Russian links.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>UK Sanctions 4 Individuals and 7 Entities over Sudan&#039;s Illicit Gold and Finance Networks</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/z431yl5pb1-uk-sanctions-4-individuals-and-7-entitie</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/z431yl5pb1-uk-sanctions-4-individuals-and-7-entitie?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 16:45:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3832-6231-4035-b534-303862373432/photo-1454793147212-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The UK has designated 4 individuals and 7 entities under its Sudan sanctions regime, targeting conflict gold trading, procurement networks and financial facilitators supporting the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>UK Sanctions 4 Individuals and 7 Entities over Sudan's Illicit Gold and Finance Networks</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3832-6231-4035-b534-303862373432/photo-1454793147212-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">UK Sanctions 4 Individuals and 7 Entities over Sudan's Illicit Gold and Finance Networks</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United Kingdom has added four individuals and seven entities to its Sudan sanctions list under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020. The new designations focus on the conflict gold trade, procurement networks, and financial facilitators that provide economic support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) or the Sudanese Armed Forces, and whose activities are considered a threat to the peace, stability, and security of Sudan.<br /><br />All of the designated parties are Sudanese, but according to the UK authorities they operate internationally, with activity traced to the gold markets of Dubai and Hong Kong.<br /><br />Among those listed are Abu Dharr Amhhed, sanctioned for channelling money and weapons to the RSF through his role in Capital Tap Holding LLC, and Mazin Gamareldin Mohamed Fadlalla, designated for providing support, financial services, and funding to the RSF via his positions in GSK Advanced Company, Tradive General Trading, and Al Jil Al Qadem General Trading.<br /><br />The entity designations include Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services, listed for making funds and economic resources available to activities threatening peace in Sudan through its links to Abu Dharr Amhhed, and Aoun Commercial Brokers LLC, identified as part of a network of companies connected to the RSF and providing it with financial services, funds, and economic resources.<br /><br />The move follows a broader international push against Sudan's conflict gold economy and comes just days after the EU introduced sectoral sanctions on gold originating in Sudan. Businesses active in precious metals trading — particularly through Dubai and Hong Kong hubs — should update their screening lists accordingly.</div>]]>
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			<title>EU Court Upholds Beloglazov Designation, Clarifies &quot;Facilitating Sanctions Circumvention&quot;</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/23m7m7mxs1-eu-court-upholds-beloglazov-designation</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/23m7m7mxs1-eu-court-upholds-beloglazov-designation?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 14:52:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6235-3332-4265-b866-643338633333/photo-1589829545856-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The EU General Court has dismissed Dimitry Beloglazov's bid to annul his Russia sanctions listing, offering key guidance on what qualifies as "facilitating circumvention" of EU restrictive measures.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU Court Upholds Beloglazov Designation, Clarifies "Facilitating Sanctions Circumvention"</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6235-3332-4265-b866-643338633333/photo-1589829545856-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">EU Court Upholds Beloglazov Designation, Clarifies "Facilitating Sanctions Circumvention"</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The EU General Court has dismissed Dimitry Beloglazov's application to annul his designation under Article 3(1)(h)(i) of Regulation (EU) 269/2014, which targets persons facilitating the circumvention of EU Russia sanctions. The judgment in Beloglazov v Council (T-492/24) is notable for its detailed commentary on the concepts of "circumvention" and "facilitating a circumvention" under EU sanctions law.<br /><br />The court accepted the EU's position that Mr Beloglazov had facilitated circumvention through a scheme in Russia to acquire Oleg Deripaska's shareholding in International LLC Rasperia. That company held 28.5 million frozen shares in the Austrian construction group Strabag, and the transaction served to remove Deripaska from the ownership chain — making it easier to sell the shares and get around the EU asset freeze.<br /><br />Mr Beloglazov challenged the legality of the designation criterion itself, arguing that "facilitating infringements of the prohibition on circumvention" breached the principles of legal certainty and proportionality. The court disagreed, holding that the criterion covers making easier an operation whose object or effect is to circumvent sanctions, whether by assisting it or lending support to its realisation.<br /><br />His remaining arguments also failed. Mr Beloglazov contended that the transaction was conditional on obtaining a sanctions licence and therefore could not amount to circumvention, that there was no EU nexus, and that he had successfully applied to annul the sale of the Rasperia shares at the time of the listing. The court found it sufficient that he had an objective intention to bypass the EU asset freeze, adding that after complex schemes come to an end, a reasonable period may need to pass before the Commission can conclude that sanctions are no longer justified.<br /><br />The ruling strengthens the EU's hand in targeting intermediaries in asset-transfer schemes and signals that structuring a deal around a licence application will not shield participants from designation.</div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>EU Extends Lebanon Sanctions Framework until July 2027</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/vf3mku6711-eu-extends-lebanon-sanctions-framework-u</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/vf3mku6711-eu-extends-lebanon-sanctions-framework-u?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 11:37:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3962-3862-4438-a234-393038306438/premium_photo-169773.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The EU has renewed its Lebanon sanctions regime under Regulation (EU) 2021/1275 until 31 July 2027. The framework remains in place, although no individuals or entities are currently designated under it.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU Extends Lebanon Sanctions Framework until July 2027</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3962-3862-4438-a234-393038306438/premium_photo-169773.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">EU Extends Lebanon Sanctions Framework until July 2027</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The European Union has renewed its Lebanon sanctions regime, established under Regulation (EU) 2021/1275, extending its validity until 31 July 2027.<br /><br />The framework allows the EU to impose autonomous restrictive measures on individuals and entities connected to Lebanon, operating alongside the UN sanctions applicable to the country. Notably, the list under this regime is currently empty — no persons or entities are designated at this time.<br /><br />The renewal nevertheless matters from a compliance perspective: by keeping the legal mechanism active, the EU preserves its ability to move quickly with designations should the political situation in Lebanon deteriorate. Businesses with Lebanese exposure should continue monitoring the regime, as listings can be introduced at short notice without a new legislative framework being required.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>EU Revises FAQ on &quot;Operator&quot; under Reg 833 after CJEU Ruling</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/v1v8tc1oa1-eu-revises-faq-on-operator-under-reg-833</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/v1v8tc1oa1-eu-revises-faq-on-operator-under-reg-833?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 22:17:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6337-3636-4630-b933-646263353536/premium_photo-168003.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The EU has amended its FAQ guidance on the meaning of "operator" under Article 2f of Regulation 833/2014, broadening the definition after the CJEU rejected the Commission's earlier interpretation.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>EU Revises FAQ on "Operator" under Reg 833 after CJEU Ruling</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6337-3636-4630-b933-646263353536/premium_photo-168003.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">EU Revises FAQ on "Operator" under Reg 833 after CJEU Ruling</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The European Union has updated its FAQ guidance on the interpretation of the term "operator" under Article 2f of Regulation (EU) 833/2014, following the Court of Justice of the EU's judgment in the Traugott Ickeroth preliminary ruling.<br /><br />In that judgment, the CJEU took issue with the definition the EU had been applying — a definition that existed only in the FAQ guidance rather than in the regulation itself. The previous version of the guidance stated that operators must be engaged in "commercial or professional activity", effectively narrowing the scope of the provision.<br /><br />The revised guidance now reflects the Court's approach. Under the updated wording, "operator" is to be understood as covering any natural or legal person directly or indirectly responsible for making available or transmitting the relevant content to the public.<br /><br />The change is significant in practice: the broader reading extends the reach of Article 2f beyond traditional commercial media and service providers, potentially capturing a wider range of parties involved in the dissemination of prohibited content. It is also a useful reminder that FAQ guidance is not binding law — where it conflicts with the regulation as interpreted by the CJEU, the Court's reading prevails.</div>]]>
			</turbo:content>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Court Upholds OFAC&#039;s Refusal to Delist Former Guatemalan Official</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/3b9kg9ffm1-us-court-upholds-ofacs-refusal-to-delist</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/3b9kg9ffm1-us-court-upholds-ofacs-refusal-to-delist?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 22:18:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6663-3861-4432-a431-393733333737/premium_photo-174245.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>A US federal court has dismissed a former Guatemalan official's challenge to his Global Magnitsky designation, ruling that OFAC's refusal to delist him was neither arbitrary nor unlawful.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Court Upholds OFAC's Refusal to Delist Former Guatemalan Official</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6663-3861-4432-a431-393733333737/premium_photo-174245.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Court Upholds OFAC's Refusal to Delist Former Guatemalan Official</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The US District Court for the District of Columbia has dismissed a delisting claim brought by Luis Martinez Morales, granting summary judgment in favour of the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The ruling was issued in Martinez Morales v US Department of the Treasury, No. 24-2519.<br /><br />Mr Martinez was designated in 2023 under the US Global Magnitsky sanctions programme, established by Executive Order 13818, over his role in the Guatemalan government for personal gain. OFAC declined his request to be removed from the list in 2025, and he took the matter to court under the Administrative Procedure Act. To succeed, he had to demonstrate that OFAC's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" (5 USC §706(2)(A)).<br /><br />The court rejected each of his arguments and sided with OFAC. It found that the designation complied with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act — the statute underpinning EO 13818 — noting that the order targets corruption worldwide, which encompassed Mr Martinez's conduct in Guatemala. The court also held that OFAC had not withheld its reasoning: the grounds appeared in the US Federal Register and in the agency's refusal letter, and redactions in the administrative record covered sensitive information without preventing Mr Martinez from mounting a challenge.<br /><br />On the substance, the court concluded that the listing was neither arbitrary nor capricious, as his conduct provided a reasonable basis to find that he had engaged in corruption meeting the EO 13818 criteria. It further praised OFAC's review as thorough and well-reasoned — pointing out, for instance, that the dismissal of a Guatemalan corruption investigation against him was not decisive, since a foreign authority's decision does not bind OFAC's independent assessment under US sanctions law.<br /><br />The judgment reinforces the substantial deference US courts afford OFAC in designation and delisting decisions, and confirms that a favourable outcome in a foreign jurisdiction will not automatically translate into relief from US sanctions.</div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>US Sanctions 50+ Individuals and Entities Tied to CJNG Cartel</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/d9fzbnd041-us-sanctions-50-individuals-and-entities</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/d9fzbnd041-us-sanctions-50-individuals-and-entities?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 13:29:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3835-3539-4637-b363-643337643037/photo-1591986706889-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US has designated over 50 Mexican individuals and entities linked to the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion in its largest-ever action against the network, including the cartel's new leader.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Sanctions 50+ Individuals and Entities Tied to CJNG Cartel</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3835-3539-4637-b363-643337643037/photo-1591986706889-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Sanctions 50+ Individuals and Entities Tied to CJNG Cartel</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has designated more than 50 Mexican individuals and entities connected to the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), which is proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the US. According to the authorities, this is the largest action ever taken against members of the cartel's network.<br /><br />The designations were made under two executive orders: EO 13224, which targets terrorists and those who support them, and EO 14059, aimed at the proliferation of illicit drugs and the means used to produce them.<br /><br />Among those sanctioned is Juan Carlos Gonzalez, described as the cartel's new leader. The measures cut the designated parties off from the US financial system and expose those who deal with them to secondary sanctions risk.<br /><br />The action reflects the continued convergence of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics tools in US sanctions policy, following the designation of several Mexican cartels as terrorist organisations. Companies with exposure to Mexican counterparties — particularly in sectors vulnerable to cartel infiltration — should treat these listings as a prompt to review their screening and due diligence.</div>]]>
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		<item turbo="true">
			<title>South Korea Detains &quot;Prada&quot; Vessel over Suspected North Korea Sanctions Breach</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/5epc6jg8k1-south-korea-detains-prada-vessel-over-su</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/5epc6jg8k1-south-korea-detains-prada-vessel-over-su?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2026 12:45:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6536-3134-4337-a234-366635363434/premium_photo-166187.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>South Korea has detained the vessel "Prada" at Pyeongtaek port over suspected breaches of UN sanctions on North Korea, and has called on the UN to designate the ship for illicit trade.</description>
			<turbo:content>
<![CDATA[<header><h1>South Korea Detains "Prada" Vessel over Suspected North Korea Sanctions Breach</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6536-3134-4337-a234-366635363434/premium_photo-166187.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">South Korea Detains "Prada" Vessel over Suspected North Korea Sanctions Breach</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">South Korea has detained a vessel named "Prada" at the port of Pyeongtaek on suspicion that it breached UN sanctions on North Korea. According to the authorities, the ship is believed to have been involved in the export of North Korean coal and iron ore — a violation of UN Resolution 2371 (2017), which prohibits such trade.<br /><br />In addition to detaining the vessel, South Korea has urged the United Nations to designate the ship under UN Resolution 1718 (2006). Such a designation would add "Prada" to the list of vessels formally identified as engaging in or facilitating illicit trade with North Korea, triggering wider international restrictions on the ship.<br /><br />The case highlights the continued role of maritime enforcement in the sanctions regime targeting North Korea, where ship-to-ship transfers and mislabelled cargo remain common evasion tactics. Companies in the shipping, insurance, and commodities sectors should treat vessel-level screening — including detention and designation histories — as an essential part of their sanctions compliance.</div>]]>
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			<title>US Amends Sudan Stabilization Sanctions Regulations with New Recordkeeping Rule</title>
			<link>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/pkemg3s8r1-us-amends-sudan-stabilization-sanctions</link>
			<amplink>https://gamlet.pro/tpost/pkemg3s8r1-us-amends-sudan-stabilization-sanctions?amp=true</amplink>
			<pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2026 15:24:00 +0300</pubDate>
			<author>Alina Iakhlakova</author>
			<category>Actualite</category>
			<enclosure url="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6633-3639-4231-b366-633162613965/photo-1626836014893-.avif" type="image/avif"/>
			<description>The US has issued a final rule amending the Sudan Stabilization Sanctions Regulations, introducing a 10-year recordkeeping requirement for payments made under the legal services general licence.</description>
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<![CDATA[<header><h1>US Amends Sudan Stabilization Sanctions Regulations with New Recordkeeping Rule</h1></header><figure><img src="https://static.tildacdn.com/tild6633-3639-4231-b366-633162613965/photo-1626836014893-.avif"/></figure><h2  class="t-redactor__h2">US Amends Sudan Stabilization Sanctions Regulations with New Recordkeeping Rule</h2><div class="t-redactor__text">The United States has published a final rule amending the Sudan Stabilization Sanctions Regulations at §546.508(b). The change updates the reporting requirements attached to the general licence that authorises payment for legal services from funds originating outside the US, adding a recordkeeping obligation.<br /><br />Under the revised requirement, recipients of payments made under the general licence must keep a record of the relevant transaction and the services provided for a period of 10 years from the date of payment. These records must be made available to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on request.<br /><br />Beyond the recordkeeping change, the final rule carries out a broader administrative update. It refreshes website and contact information across 39 CFR parts, as well as in Appendix A to Chapter V — the explanatory appendix to the US Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (SDN List).<br /><br />While much of the rule is administrative housekeeping, the new 10-year retention obligation is a practical compliance point: parties relying on the legal services general licence in the Sudan context should ensure their document-retention policies are aligned with the extended timeframe and that records can be produced for OFAC if required.</div>]]>
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